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ABSTRACT
In a carbon constrained world, the right to pollute is a new factor which comes into
play. Now that a price has been put on such emission allowances, power plant decision
makers need to take this price into consideration in their calculations concerning short-term
and long-term investment decisions.
Moreover, carbon price uncertainty due to various reasons, including climate policy has
been often be accused of being one of the reasons why investments are postponed in power
generation capacity in the EU. More specifically, the absence of long-term visibility and the
volatility of the European carbon price have been strongly criticized by European utilities.
This thesis attempts to investigate the issue of carbon price uncertainty for European
utilities and tries to evaluate its impact on the power sector finding reasons why utility
corporate investors would delay their investments in generation capacity or would favor
specific investment alternatives over others.
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CHAPTER1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Background
Tackling climate change depends on a complex system of decision making involving
many different players with each one of those responding to a different set of incentives and
risks while these interact which other. Furthermore these decisions are to be made at a
global, national and corporate level Blyth, 2007 [1].
Figure 1.1: Decision-making involves interaction between different levels Blyth, 2007[1].
In an ideal world the costs and benefits of mitigation would be known, and reflected in
international commitments within a global policy framework which allocates the necessary
emission reductions to the national level. Emission reductions would then be delivered by
companies responding to carbon price signals or other incentives and set at national or
regional level to meet the agreed reductions.
In practice, decision-making within each of the three levels is often problematic with
communication between the different levels of decision-makers being subject to
uncertainty. Not only is there uncertainty about the costs and benefits of mitigation but
these costs and benefits are significantly different for different countries. International
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negotiations lead to the fact that each country’s commitment to action depends on other
countries’ commitments. Thus, investments in a company level will depend on expectations
about the stringency of national regulation, while conversely the political will to set
stringent targets will be more or less constrained by companies’ willingness to act.
Already in 1997, governments within the UNFCC process signed the Kyoto protocol in
order to take measures against climate change and reducing GHG emissions. Following
that, the European Community has committed itself to decrease the CO2 emissions with 8%
by 2012 compared with the CO2 emissions of 1990.
In order to push European Union member states to achieve their objectives in
mitigating climate change, EU introduced a European wide emissions trading scheme (ETS)
through a directive which was adopted in 2003 and it came into force at the beginning of
2005. The failures of recent global climate change negotiations (Copenhagen, Cancoun) and
despite the implementation of a variety of climate policies around the world (IEA, 2009a
[2]), it seems that we have reached a point where we can consider that the general
agreement met in Kyoto may have been irreparably destroyed. The process is consistently
being frustrated by a lack of engagement by many countries, but most importantly the US
and China (world’s two biggest economies).This reality combined with the looming,
double-dip world economic recession (or depression?) in 2012 following the economic
crisis of 2007, makes the startup plan to support the development of a global carbon market
momentarily rather unrealizable.
In the absence of a clear global climate change policy framework, companies and
especially energy intensive companies like power generators face uncertainty regarding the
extent, timing and cost of any controls on emissions of greenhouse gases which in turn
creates significant uncertainty about the companies’ optimum investment strategy.
1.2 Power generation
Energy and particularly electricity is the basis for almost all economic activities
nowadays, linked to growth and prosperity. According to IEA, [3] World Energy Outlook
2010 world electricity demand should grow on average by 2.2% per year between 2008 to
2035, from 17,000 TWh to 30,000 TWh. To ensure an adequate supply, the investment
decisions of electricity generation companies are of great importance. Global generating
capacities during the high growth phase in the 1960s and 1970s will have to be replaced and
new capacities have to be installed, leading according to recent IEA studies to investments
in about 5,000 GW of new generating capacities between 2000 and 2030 (Birol, 2003[4]).
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Concerning the EU, substantial replacements in the power plant sector need to be realized
(not only due to increasing demand but to over aging of the generation portfolio as well, for
e.g., for Germany see Figure 1.2), which are expected to reach between 300 and 600 GW of
installed capacity (Birol, 2003 [4]).
Figure 1.2: Germany’s Generation Portfolio is Overaged: (>15 GW) Already Online Longer than
Originally Scheduled (RWE, 2011[5])
Besides its importance for the whole economy, another important characteristic of the
electrical power industry is its exposure to different kinds of uncertainty. In the past, the
two main types of uncertainty have been the uncertainty about input costs (i.e. electricity
and fossil fuel costs) and the uncertainty about future legislation.
Furthermore the environmental issue of electricity generation is of great importance
with the electricity generation companies being among the biggest emitters of greenhouse
gases emissions in industry. According to McKinsey & Company, 2009 [6] forecasts, until
2030 the global power sector will emit an estimated 18.7 gigatons of CO2-eq and as the
world has become increasingly focused on the need to reduce CO2 emissions, the electricity
sector has become a central strategy point. Even balancing emissions at the high-risk
pathway of 550 ppm atmospheric CO2 would require emissions to peak in the next 10 years
(Stern, 2007[7]). Figure 1.3 shows the reductions required for different scenarios. Reaching
the 550 level would require a cumulative reduction of 50 GtCO2e by the year 2050, a 60-
65% decrease below business-as-usual.
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Figure 1.3: Stabilization Curves at different Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations (Stern, 2007[7]).
1.3 Power generation industry and emission reductions
The potential costs for abatement in the power sector at a global scale were calculated
(McKinsey & Company, 2009[6]). Concluding that in the most optimistic scenario a
reduction of 40-60% below 2005 levels by 2030 would cost as much as €55/t (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve for the Power Sector Societal Perspective 2030
(McKinsey & Company, 2009[6]).
As far as the capacity of the investment options are concerned, there is a total emissions
reduction potential up to 14.4 GtCO2e per year in 2030 (McKinsey & Company, 2009[6]),
although industry will face unprecedented challenges to adapt to the reality of climate
change. Undoubtedly for the desirable targets to be accomplished, massive investments in
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carbon-free generation will be required. IEA, 2008[7] calculated that even if all power
plants built from now onwards are carbon-free, emissions would only decrease 25% by
2020. Thus, in the coming years, both the demand for climate-friendly energy generation
and the replacement of aging conventional generation facilities will lead to very large
capital investments and planning efforts in the utility sector i.e. in Europe which is
projected to invest over 2 trillion euro in adding and replacing power infrastructure in the
next 20 years ( IEA, 2008[7]) The future challenge for electricity utilities will be therefore
to reduce their CO2 emissions in the most economic and cost effective way.
1.4 Problem description
Even if part of the future investments will be done in renewable power plants, there will
be definitely an additional need for new thermal power plants (coal, gas, lignite and
possibly nuclear). These investments represent important strategic decisions for electric
utilities since power plants require large investments. Furthermore, these investment
decisions, especially concerning the choice of fuel and technology, although made by
private corporations, have an impact on a number of public policy goals, including energy
security and emissions of greenhouse gases.
The objective of the introduction of the EU ETS in Europe was to reduce emissions at
minimum cost and also to provide an incentive for innovation (Hoffmann, 2007[8]).The
cornerstone of this policy tool has been the imposition of a price on the emission of carbon
dioxide with the intention that this price should cause an incentive for companies that are
involved in emissions trading to reduce their CO2 emissions.
One of the biggest problems that came to light for power utilities, alongside future
energy prices uncertainty, was the uncertainty of the future CO2 price since the demand for
allowances and the cost and volume of the abatement technologies are hard to predict in
advance and subjected to uncertainty besides the regulatory uncertainty of the EU ETS after
2012. The main concern is that it is uncertain how emissions trade will influence the
profitability of an electricity company which is partly caused by the lack of knowledge on
how the CO2 price affects the profitability of an electricity company.
The price of CO2 is taken into consideration in the short-term operations of a power
plant because it increases the variable cost of daily power generation, while long term
investment decisions of a power company are affected too by the carbon price uncertainty
because they are followed by large capital outflows even before power plant
commissioning, resulting in long payback periods . Such investments expose investors to
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long run uncertainties regarding variable costs, long-term future electricity prices,
electricity demand, technology innovation risk and regulatory risk. Furthermore, these
investments are characterized by irreversibility and while preserving for the decision
makers the option to postpone investment, the competitiveness of nearly all electricity
utilities depends on meaningful ways of valuing these huge investments. In this context,
new power plant investment valuation methods including complicated models are
developed and used nowadays by decision-makers.
1.5 Aim of this Thesis
This thesis focuses on the effects of uncertain carbon dioxide (CO2) prices on
investment decisions in the electricity generation industry. This work addresses the origins
and the effects of this uncertainty concerning future emissions prices, on electricity
generating firms’ capacity investment decisions and shows the methodology used in coping
with these effects.
It has to be pointed out that in the context of this work, although other carbon policies
will be shortly discussed as well, the focus will be on power utilities which operate under
the cap-and-trade CO2 allowance scheme of the European Union (EU) called EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which is applied since 2005.
The outline of this thesis extends beyond the effects of carbon price uncertainty on
power plant investment decisions to the investment valuation tools that are at the decision-
makers disposal.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
 Chapter 2 investigates the uncertainties which are related with power plant
investments  and which  of those play  the major role in power plant profitability
and thus in investment decision making.
 Chapter 3 deals with different carbon policies, concentrating on the
background of the cap-and-trade-scheme, on which the European  EU-ETS is
based , before, in the second half of the chapter, the short history and the
experience collected in the six years of EU-ETS implementation, are discussed.
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 Chapter 4 is dedicated, while including an extended literature review, on
understanding the mechanisms which are in charge of forming the price of
carbon which is the pillar of the EU ETS.
 Chapter 5 is an extensive review of the economic and operational effects that
the carbon price imposes on power plants, including its effect on electricity
prices and short term abatement procedures.
 Chapter 6 presents modeling approaches (including literature reviews) of future
energy prices whose everyday volatility is the biggest threat for power plant
profitability and investment decision making.
 In Chapter 7 various investment methodologies and valuation methods are
described and compared, from the more simplistic to more complex  and an
extended literature review on how the carbon price uncertainty influences
investment decisions is included as well.
 Chapter 8 brings in the conclusions of the thesis.
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CHAPTER2
2 UNCERTAINTIES RELATED TO POWER PLANT
INVESTMENTS
2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty is almost everywhere in energy related decision making. It has many
sources, numerous aspects and multiple implications. From the uncertainties surrounding
global warming over the insecurity of future technological progress to the volatility of fuel
and other energy prices, the uncertainties account for an important part of the current
energy strategy puzzle. This is the reason why, despite the fact that the standard analysis of
investment choices in electricity generation uses a cost-minimizing approach, investors do
not choose to build new power stations solely on the basis of their expected costs because
sustained additional risk raises the cost of capital, and will alter investment decisions.
Companies wish to make profits, and simultaneously to avoid excessive risks, hence they
balance between the appropriate mix between risk and return.
Next we will discuss generally about sources of uncertainty to power plant investments
while afterwards we will focus on the uncertainties which affect the company’s return of
investment.
2.2 Sources of uncertainty and implications for power
generation investment
Energy investments are exposed to different types and degrees of risk, with
consequences for the cost and investment of capital. The higher the risk associated with an
investment, the higher the cost of capital and the higher the return of capital required by
investors. The amount of risk involved in any energy project and its significance vary
depending on the scope of the project: planning, construction, start-up, and operation.
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Risks occur not only from the project itself, but also from changes in the country and
international investment environment, such as economic and political conditions and energy
policies. More specifically, power plant investments are exposed to uncertainties and a
range of risks based on relatively long time planning which must be considered when
deciding on power plant investments and the high volatility of fuel prices which provoke
sudden price fluctuations while having an important influence on generation costs.
Furthermore, additional risks were created by the introduction of competition in wholesale
and retail markets due to the liberalization of the electricity markets and by the introduction
of emissions controls regulations. Table [1] shows energy sector risks which was proposed
by IEA.
Table 2.1: Risks facing Energy sector investments, source: International Energy Agency, World
Energy Investment Outlook (Paris: IEA, 2003[9]).
In a wider context there are four types of risks associated with energy investment:
economic, political, legal and force majeure risk. Moreover, Lemming [10] chooses a
simple way to describe risk by categorization based only on its effect on cost, price and
volume because financial returns are the key parameters for corporate risk management in
electricity markets.
According to literature the most fundamental risk for power generation companies,
particularly in competitive market conditions, is electricity price risk which is the major
driver for power plant investment profitability above fuel price and carbon price. As the
different risks are highly interrelated, it is important that this relationship is captured by a
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method used to determine future contribution margins for new units and determine power
plant investments interconnected with profitability. This will be discussed in chapter 7.
2.3 Main Investment decisions drivers: Risk minimization and
profitability
Any investor is interested in the cost-benefit of his investment, therefore an estimation
of the expected investment profitability is indispensable. Roques et al. (2006a)[11] show
that a probabilistic valuation model of investment is needed to give the full picture of the
expected return on an investment and its distribution.
Considering primary short-term investment decisions for existing power plants the
operational decisions of power companies are driven by the objective to maximize
profitability. Furthermore, due to the fact that different types of power plants serve different
load levels, the operational decisions which have to be made by the operators on a short-
term basis determine and adjust the production mix. Risks and uncertainties often direct
agents to invest in flexible power production technologies with short time periods for the
return of the investment, short construction time and the ability to switch between fuel
types.
In the medium and long run power companies are dealing with decisions of
undertaking new investments to move towards a less carbon intensive
technology, thus confronting with questions whether to build a new power plant and how
and when to retire an old plant. Due to the fact that economies of scale favor the
development of large power facilities with very long plant lifetimes in order to minimize the
cost of unit production, these investments are capital-intensive and long-lasting and the
decisions which have to be taken are driven by significant levels of uncertainty, particularly
relating to the price and volume of electricity sales and the price of input fuels.
In order to make the decision whether to invest or not a power utility needs to make the
best possible estimation of the expected profitability of the investment. The profitability of
a power plant investment can be calculated as follows:
Profitability per unit of electricity (€/MWh) = Electricity price (€/MWh) – fixed cost
(€/MWh) / running hours (h) – variable cost (€/MWh)
Equation 2.1: Power plant Profitability
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The sum of the fixed cost divided by the running hours and the variable cost is called
the Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). The primary objective of power generation
companies is to maximize profits by optimizing the use of their generation capacity given
the electricity price they can receive at any given time which should be high enough to
cover up the LRMC in order to make the investment profitable. We will discuss further this
topic in section 2.4.2 .
2.4 Uncertainties concerning Energy Prices
As was pointed out in section 2.2, the most fundamental risk for power generation
companies, in competitive markets is the electricity price risk which is the major driver for
power plant investment profitability above fuel price and carbon price. Figure 2.1 shows
how these prices interact and how they have evolved since the introduction of the EU ETS.
Figure 2.1: European daily Prices of a range of commodities: gas, electricity, coal and emissions,
2005-2010, source OECD 2011[12].
Next we will give a brief outline of the energy price evolution during the first half of
2011 in Europe and discuss which factors are actually the main drivers of electricity price
risk in order to get an idea of the interconnections.
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2.4.1 Energy prices in Europe for the first half of 2011
According to EON ‘s Interim Report II/2011[13] four main factors drove electricity and
natural gas markets in Europe in the first half of 2011:the rising international commodity
prices (especially oil, coal and carbon-allowance prices), macroeconomic and political
developments besides weather and natural disasters. At the start of the second quarter
energy prices continued to be driven by the unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, the
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. As the quarter progressed, however, Greece’s debt crisis
and worse prospects for economic growth in the EU became the main driver factors,
particularly in carbon allowance prices which have dropped significantly and subsequently
influenced power prices.
Concerning fuel prices after at times exceeding 125$ /barrel in April due to the unrests
in North Africa and the Middle east and supply disruptions from Libya the price fell sharply
in May, rose in early June falling again on the announcement by the IEA that IEA member
states planned to release 60 million barrels from their emergency stocks in order to relieve
tightness in the oil market.
European forward gas prices declined slightly in the second quarter of 2011.After
milder weather sent gas prices lower in April, prices reaches a high in May because of
outages at production facilities in Norway and Germany’s announcement that the shutdown
of eight nuclear power plants would be permanent. Overall gas prices experienced a
substantial recovery in the first half of 2011 following the positive developments in fuel
prices. The December carbon futures contract for next year delivery of EUA which had
risen to about 18 per metric ton by the end of March on increase power generation from
natural gas and coal due to Germany’s moratorium, subsequently trended downward with
the drivers for the low emissions prices being Greece’s debt crisis and worse economic
prospects for EU growth.
In Germany baseload electricity futures prices for 2012 delivery increased in the first
half mainly by 10% mainly because of the Japan crisis, Germany’s moratortium concerning
the immediate phase out of eight nuclear reactors and rising gas coal and carbon prices.
Finally they fell through the end of June by 3€ to 57 € per MWh tracking the decline of
carbon-allowance prices.
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2.4.2 Electricity price uncertainty
Electricity price risks arise because of uncertainties about future prices for electricity.
These in turn arise for a range of reasons, from volatility in fuel prices to large scale
economic events or political changes or problems with power stations. Market structures
under liberalized markets differ between countries and are subject to change over time.
Before liberalization, regulated electricity prices corresponded to average costs of power
generation. In a liberalized competitive power market instead, prices are expected to equal
short-run marginal costs. In the long run, the competitive price level should not exceed
long-run marginal costs of new power plants which are the sum of the fixed costs and the
variable costs divided by the running hours. Power generation companies will always
attempt to shape their decisions with long term impacts so as to move from the short run
marginal cost curve (which includes capital costs and incorporates the generation marginal
costs) to the long run marginal cost curve (Weber and Swider, 2004 [14]).
Figure 2.2: Long-term cost functions as lower bound to short term cost functions, source Weber and
Swider, 2004 [14]).
However, in a noncompetitive environment prices may exceed the former price level
because of either mark-ups or strategic investment withholding. Figure 2.3 compares these
different price development scenarios.
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Figure 2.3: Price scenarios in liberalized markets, Handbook Utility Management, 2009 [15].
Under the above assumption of unregulated markets with the electricity price
depending on the short run marginal costs of the marginal unit, the factors that influence
electricity prices are the following:
 Fuel and carbon price uncertainty which affect the costs of the marginal unit and
influence the clearing price.
 A change of electricity volume demand or supply can switch the unit that sets the
price. On the short-term, such an effect can be for instance due to feed-in from
electricity produced by renewable sources which must be integrated into the grid
due to legal obligations. On the long-term, such changes might be due to a changing
electricity demand or modifications of the power generation fleet which in turn can
be triggered by future political decisions or the behavior of competitors, which are
both uncertain.
Another important source of electricity price risk results from the long run investment
dynamics that arise in competitive electricity market environments (Gross et al., 2007[16]).
If flexibility exists to delay investments and if electricity prices are low, i.e., near the short-
run marginal cost of power production (which in turn is influenced by the carbon price),
then there might be too little incentive to invest in generating capacity. Later, when capacity
reserves diminish and the market becomes tighter, a boom phase may be triggered during
which new capacity is brought on line in order to gain from the higher prices and to gain
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market shares. Overall, such boom–bust cycles can lead to cycles in both electricity prices
and security of supply (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Investment and price cycles in a competitive market (Gross et al., 2007[16]).
2.4.3 Fuel price uncertainty
Fuel price uncertainty has a significant effect on generation costs. In most countries the
biggest part of electricity being produced comes from fossil fuels. Depending on the type of
power plant, fuel costs could account up to 30% (for coal plants) and up to 65% (for CCGT
plants) of the total costs. Consequently, the major uncertainty in terms of price fluctuations
in the fuel markets especially the one for natural gas, is being reflected in thermal power
plants generation costs.
Furthermore fuel prices influence the electricity price. If we consider having
unregulated markets, the electricity price corresponds to the short run marginal costs of the
most expensive unit in the merit order producing electricity. The price-determining unit is
often a gas or a coal plant, so fuel price volatility influences electricity prices as well.
(Figure 2.5 shows recent trends of fossil energy prices concerning the past 5 years while
Figure 2.6 shows these costs translated in Power plant fuel costs).
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Figure 2.5: Trend of fossil energy prices source, Aıd R., 2011[17].
Figure 2.6: Power plant fuel cost (Euros/Mwh) source, Aıd R., 2011[17].
2.4.4 Electricity demand and uncertainty about the competition’s
decisions
Electricity demand and the uncertainty about the competition’s decisions may firstly
change the amount of electricity that is produced by the considered units and secondly,
influence electricity prices by changing the marginal unit. The decisions of the competitions
have a similar effect as changes in the electricity demand.
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Furthermore, additional units from competitors may decrease the amount of electricity
produced by the own units and on the other hand, even if they have no impact on the
electricity production of the own units, they may change the electricity price by changing
the marginal unit.
2.5 Regulatory risks and climate change policy
Power utilities act in energy markets under a framework set by political decisions and
are therefore vulnerable in regulatory risks (Figure 2.7). E.g., regulatory measures such as
imposed carbon policies or the recent reconsideration (i.e. moratorium) of the German
nuclear policy can have significant impacts on electricity generation. For Europe, the major
political decision which has had a catalytic impact on European electricity generation has
been the implementation of the EU-ETS, established by Directive 2003/87/EC. Due to its
coming to force, new costs were created, which have to be taken into account for power
plant investments.
Figure 2.7: Major regulatory measures in the european utility market for a power utility i.e. RWE
[5].
Furthermore there are more uncertainties in climate policy, such as the political context
within which climate policy is developed (e.g. the level of government support for climate
policy measures or concerns about energy security) and the manner in which it is being
implemented (e.g. if government is seen as committed to climate policy). Some of the
sources of uncertainty faced by electricity utilities are briefly listed below:
 The degree of government support for policy action on climate change, over the
short and long term.
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 Whether there will be a post-2012 international regime, and whether this will be
target- or process based.
 The specific policy instruments used.
 Differences in implementation between different countries.
 The future price of carbon.
 Allocation rules.
 Subsidy levels for specific technologies.
 The timing of policy responses.
 The response of other companies to specific policy measures.
 The degree of support for climate policy measures among companies and
investors.
 The relationship between climate policy goals and other policy goals such as
energy security.
The evaluation beforehand of the effectiveness of undertaken climate change policy
measures, faces complications which are based on uncertainties dealing with technology
costs and on the impossibility to forecast the responses of the players affected by the policy
measures. There is a need for an equilibrium between certainty and flexibility concerning
climate change policies: These need to be neither too fixed, because this would push policy
makers to actions that would be either too strict or not strict enough, with limited freedom
for adaptation, nor too flexible, because this would create an additional cost to companies
being forced to meet decisions on a volatile policy environment basis.
In the following section we will discuss the impact of risk on the very important issue
of generation technology and as an example we will mention carbon capture and storage
(CCS).
2.6 Risks and Investments in Different Generation Technology
Choices
Economic, political, legal and force majeure risk factors affect different generation
technologies in different ways. Some risks are inherent to the technology involved while
others involve the interaction of technology and the environment in which the generating
company operates. E.g., the investment costs of a coal plant are very high, but the fuel costs
(and hence operating costs) are relatively low with the coal prices at the same time having
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in comparison to other types of fuel very low volatility. Coal-fired power stations are
therefore more exposed to the financial risks concerning the repayment of the initial capital
of the project based on future electricity volumes and prices. A similar effect concerns
renewable technologies such as wind and solar power which have zero fuel cost, and hence
low operating costs, with the main costs being the initial capital. On the contrary, gas plants
have relatively low capital costs and flexible operations, but high fuel price dependency
leaving such projects exposed to uncertainties in the future gas price.
A qualitative comparison of the risk characteristics of different types of generating
power plant technologies is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Qualitative comparison of the risk characteristics of different generation technologies
source, International Energy Agency, Power Generation Investment in Electricity Markets (Paris:
IEA, 2003[18]).
Regulatory risk can influence decisively the generation technology choice. According
to Blyth, 2007 [1], technologies which are low-carbon and additionally high capital
investments e.g. nuclear power and renewables , are vulnerable to climate change policy
changes. Due to the fact that the cost basis of such technologies is not affected while
operating inside an emissions trading scheme, these gain only  indirect benefits, which
consist merely of the pass-through of costs from the fossil fuel generating plants to the price
of electricity. If electricity prices increase they succeed additional revenues for all types of
generators, with the effect on profits not being the same for all, though. Concerning fossil
fuel generators profits, their rise is weakened by a simultaneous increase in costs caused by
the additional emissions costs but at the same time this weakening of profits makes their
future profit margin  less sensitive to big CO2 price variations and therefore less exposed to
climate change regulatory risks than nuclear or renewable generators.
Research and investments in a new technology called carbon capture and storage (CCS)
is affected as well since the introduction of the EU ETS. This technology takes CO2 from
combustion plants, transports it through pipelines and then pumps it down into different
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types of sites for long-term storage. According to Hoffmann, 2007[8] however, while this
technology allows the reduction of the CO2 emission of fossil fuel power plants by up to
90%, it also reduces the efficiency of power generation and only becomes profitable at
allowance prices of about 30 euros per ton CO2. Given the high price volatility of
allowances, the regulatory uncertainty that surrounds the EU ETS, and uncertainties about
the feasibility of CCS technology, investments are associated with a high risk. Quoting an
interviewee (Hoffman, 2007[8]):
“For us, it is a huge risk to invest in CCS because we do not know whether it will be
profitable after 2012. We need a CO2 price of Euro 30 per ton. But then the EU cannot
perform a solo attempt and needs in the long term the USA, China, and India on its side.
These countries will, however, not take part in a system which has a price of over Euro 5
per ton. This means a high risk and poses the question whether CCS will be profitable”.
From the perspective of the CO2 emitter, the key risks associated with this new
technology are uncertainty over the costs of the CO2 separation equipment, over the
performance and security of the storage sites and over how much the avoidance of
emissions will be worth in terms of reduced costs of emitting CO2. If coal plants are built in
a suitable way and at a proper location, CCS can be relatively easily retrofitted at a later
date. It therefore provides coal plant with a good hedge against uncertain future CO2 prices.
If CO2 prices remain low, the coal plant can continue to be operated without the capture
plant, but if they rise sufficiently high, then CCS can be retrofitted. The existence of CCS as
a future retrofit option therefore makes current investment in coal look significantly more
attractive. Thus investment in coal-fired power generation could accelerate while
investment in CCS itself may not be implemented until carbon prices are significantly
higher than they are today – a situation that would lead to an increase in emissions in the
short term unless overall emissions are capped.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we pointed out that a power utility needs to make the best possible
estimation of the expected profitability of an investment before it makes the decision
whether to invest or not.
The task to optimize power plant profitability is becoming more and more complex
due to its dependence on various risks which include the highly uncertain and volatile
electricity, fuel and carbon prices.
Consequently, investors have to use more sophisticated approaches to determine
optimal investment levels and technology choices than they used in regulated markets.
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CHAPTER3
3 CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY
3.1 Introduction
An introduction to the different carbon policies will be provided in this chapter, with
special focus on the European EU Emissions Trading Scheme. We will focus on the basics
of the regulatory mechanisms to reduce emissions and provide a background for analysis on
the emissions trading scheme and its impact on the investments of electricity producers.
The first section gives a broad overview of economic instruments for environmental
policy while discussing the major types of carbon policy. The second section will look at
how emissions trading has functioned as a policy instrument in Europe by looking at the
specifics of the EU ETS .
We will conclude with an analysis of how uncertainty in CO2 prices arises due to
climate negotiations and also due to the market structure of the EU ETS. This weakens the
price-signal created by policy, decreasing the incentive for companies to invest in
abatement.
3.2 Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy
Economists perceive environmental problems as a problem of externalities.
Considering that a negative externality is a cost while a positive externality is a benefit
economists argue that global climate change is a negative externality. Although there is
both a cost for the greenhouse gases damages and a scarcity in the capacity of the
atmosphere to absorb them, the lack of a market price means the cost is borne by society
and is external to economic decision-making.
Economic instruments are used for environmental regulation in order to provide
incentives through price-signals rather than through the explicit instructions of command-
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and-control (CAC) (i.e. (Stavins, 2002[19].). In this way, corporations take measures that
are in their own self-interest which will then collectively meet policy goals.
3.3 Carbon policies and their effects
3.3.1 Introduction
Global climate change can be considered as the “Tragedy of the Commons” for which
no effective global coordination, regulation, or enforcement has yet been developed [
Hardin G. [20]. This has not happened for a variety of reasons. First, CO2 is a global
pollutant, which implies that the regulation of local emissions needs to be coordinated
worldwide. Second, fossil fuels make up the most used fuel type of the industrialized
economies: Reducing or replacing their consumption is difficult and costly. The price of
carbon is the generic term for placing a price on carbon through either subsidies, a carbon
tax, or an emissions trading ("cap-and-trade") system. Following we will discuss the most
important of these carbon policies.
3.3.2 Carbon taxation vs emissions trading
The price of carbon is the generic term for placing a price on carbon through either
subsidies, a carbon tax, or an emissions trading ("cap-and-trade") system. Table 3.1 presents
an overview of the present prevailing types of carbon policies.
Table 3.1: Electricity generation in a carbon constrained world: characterization of carbon policies
Chappin.E., 2010 [21].
The growing consensus that CO2 emissions need to be stabilized and then reduced
during this century has led to much interest in achieving cost-efficient emission reduction
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through incentive-based instruments rather than command-and-control regulation. Taxes
and cap-and-trade systems can be viewed as extreme examples of the two main market-
based approaches that are available to correct an emissions externality. To reach a pre-
defined emissions target the government can use price or quantity policy instruments, i.e. a
tax or a cap-and-trade approach. Emission rights (allowances or permits) are either supplied
(with infinite elasticity) at a fixed price (i.e. a tax) or (with zero elasticity) at a fixed supply
(i.e. a cap). Description of both policies follows:
1. Emissions (carbon) taxation: For every specified amount of emission a tax has to
be paid. With this policy instrument it is not guaranteed that the emission objective
is realized. Installations reduce emissions until further reductions have a higher cost
than paying the emission tax.
2. (Emissions) cap and (allowance) trade: Each source is allowed to emit until a
specified cap. This is direct regulation and an emission objective can be realized. In
this system a specified, gradual declining, amount of allowances is allocated and the
allowances can be traded. This is a market based policy and an emission objective
can be realized and this can in theory be done at the minimum cost.
An incentive-based policy instrument intends to create an effective carbon price signal.
A carbon tax represents a more stable price signal but it is difficult to establish ex ante
which tax level would be required to achieve the desired emission reduction. On the other
side, cap and trade tends to be a more complex regulatory scheme than the carbon tax and it
leads to uncertainty regarding the price of carbon emissions. This uncertainty occurs
because, unlike a tax, the price of an allowance fluctuates in a dynamic, market setting
manner and can plummet quite sharply when supply increases and/or demand decreases (for
e.g. like the one noticed during the 2007 global recession). Consequently this has led to
fears that the uncertainty of the carbon price might lead investors to defer investments into
“clean technologies”.
3.3.3 Hybrid policies
Recently several observers of the carbon market, mainly from the UK, proposed the
introduction of CO2-price floors and ceilings containing elements of both price and quantity
regulation, which according to them could reduce the uncertainty of future CO2-prices.
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Such an approach was named a hybrid tax and trading approach (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
2009[22]).
Wood and Jotzo (2010) [23] point out that price floors in greenhouse emissions trading
schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility and management
of cost uncertainty (although implementation has potential pitfalls). Under a pure cap-and-
trade scheme, the regulator has to continually react to decreasing carbon prices by adjusting
emissions targets in order to stimulate further emissions reductions, with the carbon price
floor, on the other hand, he has the potential to induce emissions reductions automatically.
By using price ceilings and/or price floors it is possible to generate a regulation system
which lies between the tax and the cap-and-trade schemes. The narrower the price band, the
more closely it resembles a pure carbon tax, while the wider the band, the closer it comes to
a pure emissions trading scheme.
Price ceilings are a widely recognized option to limit the risk that carbon prices exceed
acceptable levels if constraining emissions turn out to be more expensive than expected.
They thus provide a reduction in upside price risk to emitters. The mirror instrument is a
price floor, which would ensure a minimum price on carbon, thereby providing a downside
risk reduction for investors in low emissions technologies. It would also allow emissions to
undershoot the target set by the administrator, thus providing more abatement if costs are
lower than expected (Wood and Jotzo, 2010[23]). Both price ceilings and price floors can
reduce risk and price volatility in carbon markets, which has been of concern in all types of
emissions trading systems.
Although there are alternative mechanisms, such as carbon taxes or fees on emissions,
cap-and-trade schemes have emerged as the prevailing tool for addressing GHG emissions
in the EU and elsewhere..
Next we will focus on cap-and-trade schemes, the way they are functioning and finally
we will focus on EU ETS.
3.4 Framework of a market-based solution: cap-and-trade
schemes
The framework for emissions trading as a policy instrument developed on the basis of
the presence of pollution as an externality which could be corrected if there was an
economic incentive and a possibility for actors to bargain. Property rights define the right to
pollute, thus the market would play a role in pollution control policy (Tietenberg,
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2006[24]). The government, as the owner of a natural system, could implement a cap on an
acceptable level of pollution and issue an amount of emissions rights up to this amount.
Then it would simultaneously pass a law that required anyone discharging pollution to hold
the rights to do so. The rights would be fully tradeable, allowing the market to price the
rights accordingly and freeing the government of the administrative and political burden of
setting the price. Experiments with emission trading systems started in the 1970s in the US
(Tietenberg, 2006[24])) resulting in 1990 in the CO2 emission trading scheme.
Figure 3.1: Cost-Effectiveness and the Emission Permit System, Source 1=7 allowances; Source 2=8
allowances, C=marginal cost of control for Source 2, A=marginal cost of control for Source 1,
B=the allowance price in trade (equilibrium, 5 and 10), (source: Tietenberg T.H.,, Environmental &
Natural Resource Economics ,ch.15).
3.5 Outline of an emissions trading scheme
First, the total allowable emissions are limited (cap), and a corresponding number of
allowances (also called permits) are created and distributed, which in turn may be bought or
sold on a market (trade). Second, regulated emissions are monitored and verified and at the
end of a compliance period, typically a calendar year each unit has to return allowances
equivalent to the amount of emissions to the regulator. In theory, a firm will minimize the
cost of compliance by abating pollution until its marginal cost equals the market price of an
allowance. For this reason, cap-and-trade programs are cost-effective, i.e. achieve the
desired amount of emissions reduction at the lowest possible total abatement cost. An
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additional goal of a cap-and-trade system could be to promote technological innovation to a
greater extent than automatically induced by the long-term price signals from a market. In
such a case, uncertainty over future prices may be a good starting point for a policy
intervention, since it plays an important role for investment decisions.
3.6 Description of the EU ETS
Although emissions trading systems have been established in at least six states in the
United States, the most recent application of a cap-and-trade mechanism and at the same
time the largest in the world is the European Union Environmental Trading Scheme (EU
ETS).
Its main pillar is the carbon market in which emission allowances can be traded with
the expectation to succeed an economically optimal distribution of emissions among agents.
It remains to be seen, however, whether it creates sufficient investment incentives for
electricity producers, because as mentioned above, the price of emission rights is volatile
and the time horizon of the ETS is limited.
Due to a significant degree of uncertainty regarding the structure of a future global
agreement on climate change, it is crucial for the EU to find the right balance between
policies striving towards a low-carbon economy and maintaining competitiveness of
European industry. The objective of EU ETS is to provide incentives (i.e. price signals) to
reduce emissions at least-cost while moving the economy onto a lower carbon level. The
EU ETS, which came into force on 1 January 2005 and was established through Directive
2003/87/EC:
 Phase I : 2005 to 2007, first trading period (trial period)
 Phase II: 2008 to 2012, second trading period
 Phase III: 2013 to 2020, third trading period
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Figure 3.2: Structure and history of EU ETS, source Deutsche Bank Research,2009[25].
It is a ‘cap and trade’ regime which sets limits on carbon dioxide emissions from
currently more than 12,000 installations representing over 2 billion tons of CO2 (almost half
of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions), thus being the largest emissions trading scheme in
the world. It currently includes combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel
plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, and pulp and paper. Other
sectors, e.g. aviation, will be brought into the EU ETS in 2012. Within these sectors, all
facilities above a certain size (the specific thresholds are set by national governments) must
hold emission certificates to cover their CO2 emissions. Under the scheme, each member
state allocates a certain number of allowances (allowances to emit one ton of CO2
equivalent, referred to as European allowances or EUAs) to its industrial installations based
on the country’s National Allocation Plan (NAP).
The EU Commission decides if the NAP fulfills criteria imposed by the Emissions
Trading Directive and most importantly whether the request is aligned with the member
state's Kyoto target. Once this is established, individual states are free to allocate permits to
industrial operators covered by the scheme. There are several types of allocation methods.
Allocation can be through grandfathering where allowances are given for free according to
historical emissions. There can also be an allowance auction where companies bid for a
given quantity of allowances.
Once an initial allocation is made, polluters can trade. Trading is advantageous because
it allows companies to benefit from differences in abatement costs. Operators must have a
quantity of carbon credits that matches their verified emissions at the end of each year.
Those that have a surplus can sell privately or in one of several established markets. Those
that are short must buy permits and if they fail to do so, must pay a fee. The standard carbon
credit is known as an European Union Allowance (EUA). There are additional types of
permits linked to the EU ETS. EUAs can be substituted with what are known as Certified
Emission Reductions (CERs) which come from United Nations validated abatement
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projects in developing countries. There are also Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) which
come from Joint Implementation Projects and are also UN validated.
The price of the allowance provides a price-signal for changes in operation behavior. It
encourages corporations to take abatement measures by acting on their own self-interest to
minimize their costs. While the EU ETS provides an incentive, it does not guarantee that
reductions will take place at individual installations. This will be dependent on the decisions
of firms and individuals.
The ETS significantly alters the competitive landscape in the EU. Opponents argue
that EU industries are put at a competitive disadvantage to the same industries abroad and
therefore outside the ETS. This could cause companies to either move production abroad or
increase production in plants based abroad, and thereby never actually achieve emissions
abatement.
3.6.1 The three Phases of EU-ETS
The establishment of the ETS is a dynamic process and has been set up in three phases.
Due to the fact that the carbon allowance market is practically a virtual market with no
natural demand for carbon allowances, it depends absolutely on the  regulatory framework.
Phase I from 2005-2007 was the ‘’trial phase’’. In this phase, all installations
participating in the scheme were provided with carbon credits corresponding 100% to their
respective emissions. Unfortunately, after a year of operation, it was discovered that most
installations had been oversupplied with carbon credits (over-allocation) on the basis of
falsely calculated benchmarks. Consequently the carbon market then collapsed making
allowances worthless. ( Figure. 3.3.).
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Figure 3.3: Carbon price in Phase 1: Over-allocation became apparent when emission data for 2005
were published (De Bruyn, S.M, 2010[26]).
Phase II is the phase we are currently in, and runs from 2008 to 2012. Credits from this
phase can be banked to Phase III, meaning that no carbon price fall is expected. However,
the current global financial crisis has caused industrial production to slow down, thus
causing a decrease in the power demand. Consequently this implies that less emissions are
being produced and, with the annual quota of free carbon credits fixed, the carbon credit
demand collapsed. Finally, traded allowance volumes during this phase have been multiple
times higher than the volume needed to cover short and long allocations, a fact which
indicates the existence of a significant grade of speculation.
Phase III is planned to run from 2013-2020. It is anticipated that the demand for carbon
credits will soar if and when the economy recovers from the financial crisis, though
pessimists forecast a non-growth ,‘’lost decade’’ for the world economy and particularly for
Europe which would become the tombstone of the EU ETS. The preliminary plan of the
bureaucrats from Brussels is that by 2020 there will be a 21% reduction in allowances
compared with 2005. If, however, a post-Kyoto international agreement would be reached
on specific reductions, this percentage could eventually increase to 30%. Taking into
consideration the debacle of the Copenhagen conference in 2009, the fact that the Cancun
conference in 2010 was doomed to failure before it even begun and the zero expectations of
the Durban conference in 2011, the future of EU ETS looks as if it is heading towards its
end. A change set to be implemented during this phase is that previously freely allocated
allowances are about to be auctioned leaving thus to the market forces to guarantee a more
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effective allocation of allowances. Nevertheless according to an exemption set by the EU,
industries exposed to a significant risk of not being competitive within the EU will be
granted 100% of their allowances free of charge in Phase III.
3.7 Creating an effective price signal
Incentive-based policy instruments such as the European emissions trading system and
carbon taxation use market signals to influence decision making and behavior.
As already mentioned in sector 3.2 the economic theories behind emissions trading tell
us that climate change is an externality and in order to correct this, there must be a cost for
the use of a resource.
The premise of the EU ETS rests on the assumption that a price, through the self-
interested behavior of individuals, will promote changes in behavior. This is also referred to
as a price-signal. In the electricity sector, the price-signal will do two things. For
consumers, the price of electricity will include the costs of the damages caused by its CO2
emissions. This increase in price will reduce consumption to some degree depending on the
elasticity of demand. For producers, it will encourage changes in how electricity is
generated. Both consumers and producers will play a role in reducing emissions but we
know that demand for electricity will continue to grow over the next 30 years so there will
need to be investments in low-carbon generation. In light of a significant degree of
uncertainty regarding the structure of a future global agreement on climate change, it is
crucial for the EU to find the right balance between policies striving towards a low-carbon
economy and maintaining competitiveness of European industry. The objective of EU ETS
is to provide incentives (i.e. price signals) to reduce emissions at least-cost while moving
the economy onto a lower carbon level.
The reality that has been experienced in the implementation of the EU ETS shows that
the price-signal is not as straightforward as theory suggests. Several examples have been
given of how specific aspects of the policy can alter the price-signal. E.g., the free
allocation of permits. In Phase I and II, grandfathering of permits was shown to have the
effect of raising electricity prices but not promoting reductions in emissions (Sijm et al.,
2006[27]).
There was also the effect of volatile carbon prices due to uncertainty about levels of
emissions in relation to the cap. In May 2006, the price of permits plummeted because of
this. These issues weaken the price-signal of the EU ETS. The biggest barrier to widespread
investments remains uncertainty over the future price of CO2. Companies faced with the
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choice of an uncertain cash flow may choose to wait for policy signals to become clearer.
By forgoing investment, a company may have a clearer picture of future scenarios but this
option will come at the cost of lost income had the investment been pursued earlier (Blyth
et al., 2007[28]).
It is important to take uncertainty as a serious barrier to the functioning of the EU ETS.
It can be said that two major sources of uncertainty have developed in the EU ETS,
uncertainty over the future course of climate policy and also uncertainty related to the
structure of the carbon market.
3.8 The economic downturn and Europe’s emissions market
The second phase of the EU ETS faced the effect of the economic and financial
crisis that began in late 2008. The recession led to a more dramatic decline in emissions
than most players could have imagined. Based on data released on April 1, 2010 [29],
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en_phase_ii.htm, GHG emissions from reporting EU
ETS installations fell more than 11% in 2009, which is the biggest year-on-year drop since
the EU ETS began in 2005. The data from 9,866 installations show that their total emissions
decreased to 1.69 billion tons in 2009, 214 million tons less than in 2008. (State and Trends
of the Carbon Market 2010, [30]).
Utilities experienced relatively modest declines in demand, although they are still
potentially short in this Phase and will need to hedge their future electricity sales beyond
2013.
A positive sign deriving from the financial crisis concerned in my opinion the
efficiency of the EU ETS as a market mechanism because it has been able to reflect macro-
economic trends. To be more specific, the fact that carbon prices fell along with the prices
of mature energy commodities as the global economic crisis deepened, and rebounded as
soon as there were signs of recovery, suggests the market is both efficient and rational
3.9 Conclusions
The price of carbon dioxide emissions is acknowledged to become an important factor
affecting future investment decisions. Greenhouse gas emissions are economic externalities
whose cost is borne by society but is external to economic decision-making. Regulators try
to correct this by giving a price to carbon so that polluters have an incentive to adjust
emissions to a level that is socially optimal. The EU ETS has integrated the externalities of
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greenhouse gas emissions into financial transactions. The policy is now in its second phase
of implementation and is due to expand in its third phase.
In Europe, electricity generation accounts for one third of CO2 emissions. The success
of an emissions trading scheme therefore depends in significant part on the reduction of
emissions from the power sector. The success of the EU ETS in reducing emissions in the
electricity generation sector will depend on its ability to push power companies to invest in
clean-power through a clear market signal.
Some of the biggest barriers are conditions of market and policy uncertainty which
increased risk for abatement projects. The problem of policy uncertainty is due to the fact
that CO2 permits are a virtual commodity with no natural demand except that created by
legislators. The EU is in a situation where it depends on an international climate agreement
which seems very distant considering the failures in Copenhagen and the outburst of the
economic crisis.
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CHAPTER4
4 THE FUNDAMENTALS THEORY OF THE EU ETS PRICE
FORMATION
4.1 The fundamental drivers of carbon price
CO2 price is determined by demand and supply on the CO2 market. Total supply is
dictated by the UNFCCC allocation quota which is lowered every year (with a small
amount of additional supply created by carbon credit generating projects), with the number
of allowances as mentioned in section 3.7 distributed, being determined by each member-
state through National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which are then harmonized at the EU level
by the European Commission.
Demand is determined by industrial and energy sector production. In turn, the level of
emissions depends on a large number of factors, such as unexpected fluctuations in energy
demand, energy prices and weather conditions. The demand for allowances can be affected
by economic growth and financial markets as well. As the EU ETS is a politically
constructed market, it behaves differently from other commodity markets. This demand and
supply is influenced by a lot of factors which makes forecasting of demand and supply
difficult.
Three examples of important factors are discussed below to show the CO2 price
uncertainty, which is the reason that the CO2 price is a major risk for investment decisions.
Further factors influencing the price of carbon will be discussed through the literature
review.
 Policy Uncertainty
Although the EU ETS provides emissions targets till 2020, European electricity
corporations remain dependent on international climate negotiations. The EU and the rest of
the world witness an uncertainty concerning the future of a likely climate agreement. On
one hand, the EU ETS needs a strong carbon price signal for legitimacy; on the other hand,
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European legislators know that if international agreements do not come to fruition, such a
strong stance will cost Europe a lot in terms of competitiveness.
With the likelihood of a global deal on climate change policy most uncertain, a split
and local approach to regulating carbon emissions is beginning to consolidate, with several
economies implementing different emissions-control policies, which will ultimately impose
different carbon costs on their industries.
In such a context, carbon leakage -or the carbon policy-driven migration of production
(and emissions) to regions with less stringent or nil carbon constraints- has become a key
policy concern. The problem is very real and is one of the main concerns for European
lawmakers. If this happens in a large scale, the EU ETS will accomplish nothing to reduce
emissions and will drive industry away from Europe (what has actually already started to
happen in Germany, additionally due to the recently decided nuclear reactor phase-
out),which possibly be the worst-case scenario.
 Market Uncertainty: Fuel prices and demand
As we already pointed out in section 2.4.3, fuel price is the major determinant of the
variable costs of power production having an effect on which power plants are cheapest to
run and this in turn affects the CO2 emissions from the plants that are dispatched. For
example low coal prices reduce the cost of coal production and increasing coal production
increases CO2 emissions. Also demand for CO2 reduction in the future is uncertain.
 Technological uncertainty:
Technological development determines which technologies will be available to reduce
CO2 emissions. This in turn determines also the potential volume of reductions. It also
determines the cost of abatement by learning effects. The development of technology in the
future is hard to predict. Because it is depending on policy support and company effort in
R&D
 Market uncertainty
Market uncertainty is related to policy uncertainty. Markets are good at pricing-in
future expectations and the uncertainty over future climate policy affects the price of
carbon. There are also other factors that contribute to market uncertainty which are due to
the structure of emissions markets. A fundamental problem exists in the way that the carbon
market adjusts to changes in supply and demand. A sudden change in supply, like what
happened in April of 2006 very quickly led the carbon price to plummet. There is a
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fundamental problem in the inability of the market to adjust through the supply side. Since
supply cannot adjust because there is a cap, the only way for the market to adjust is through
price (Figure 4.1) which combined with the high uncertainty in the demand of allowances
leads to wild price swings.
Figure 4.1: CO2 Allowance Price Volatility, source: Pointcarbon, 2009[31].
4.2 Literature review on carbon pricing mechanisms
Chevallier, 2011[32] provided a systematic update on the literature of carbon price
mechanisms from 2007 onwards. It identified the relationships between the price of CO2 on
the one hand, and its main fundamentals that allow to explain and forecast its variation
overtime on the other hand.
4.2.1 The emissions shortfall factor
The best example of the influence of institutional decisions on the price development of
carbon may be found during the year 2006. At that time Ellerman and Buchner, 2008[33]
report that the first report of verified emissions published by the European Commission at
the aggregated EU-wide level has had a dramatic impact on the carbon price, which fell by
almost fifty percent in a few days. As afore mentioned, the main reason behind this
structural change in the price of carbon was found in the ratio of allocated allowances to
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actual emissions: as all installations surrendered their quotas and sent their information to
the regulator, it could be assessed for the first time that the carbon market was “over-
allocated”.
4.2.2 Banking restrictions
An important effect of institutional decisions is the decision by the European
Commission to ban the transfer of any banked or borrowed allowances from Phase I (2005-
2007) to Phase II (2008-2012). Consequently, any allowances in surplus as of December 31,
2007 would be worthless on January 1, 2008. The main reason behind that decision may be
that the European Commission did not want to transfer market design imperfections from
the first test period of the scheme to the corresponding period of commitment of the Kyoto
Protocol. Therefore, the banking instrument, which allows industrial operators to smooth
emissions and to manage their stock of allowances, has been “sacrificed” in October 2006.
From that date until the end of Phase I, two price signals have been coexisting:
CO2 spot and futures prices December 2007 valid for phase I which were moving towards
zero and CO2 futures prices valid for phase II fluctuating in the range of twenty euros (with
a perception of increased allowance scarcity during 2008-2012).
4.2.3 The influence of fuel (oil, gas, and coal ) prices
Based on economic analysis (essentially demand and supply fundamentals),
Christiansen et al., 2005[34] have identified the following factors as being the price
determinants in the EU ETS: Policy and regulatory issues; market fundamentals, including
the emissions-to-cap ratio, the role of fuel-switching, weather and production levels.
Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007[35] and Alberola et al., 2008a [36] were the first to report
econometrically the relations between energy markets and the CO2 price. Based on phase I
spot and futures data, the former group of authors determined that carbon prices in the EU
ETS are linked to fossil fuel (e.g., oil, gas, coal) use. By using an extended dataset, the latter
group of authors emphasize that the nature of this relationship between energy and carbon
prices varies depending on the period under consideration and the major influence of
institutional events
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4.2.4 Power producers’ fuel-switching behavior
The demand for fossil fuels depends on their absolute as well as relative prices. From
that perspective, the marginal fuel-switching costs from highly carbon-intensive sources of
energy (such as coal) to lower carbon-intensive sources for power and heat generation (such
as gas) constitute another important determinant of the CO2 price.
As a general rule-of-thumb, carbon abatement in the short-run heavily depends on the
behavior of power and heat operators, who are the main actors under the EU ETS.
Moreover, emissions abatement costs from the power sector are assumed to be the lowest
compared to other sectors, based on fuel-switching from coal to gas. Among other
contributions, Delarue and D’haeseleer, 2007[37], Alberola et al., 2008a [38], and Keppler
and Mansanet-Bataller, 2010[39] separately studied these causalities between CO2 and
electricity variables (such as clean dark and clean spark spreads, and the switch price)
during the first phases of the EU ETS.
4.2.5 The role played by temperatures and extreme weather events
As documented by Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007[35] and Alberola et al., 2008 [38],
CO2 prices are also affected by unexpected climatic variations. For instance, cold winters
(hot summers) increase the need for heating (cooling) by using electricity. Alberola et al.,
2008 [38] show that extreme and unanticipated temperature events have a statistically
significant effect on carbon price changes. Furthermore, rainfalls, wind speed and hours of
sunshine directly affect the share of power generated by carbon-free heat generation from
hydropower, wind and solar energy. Taken together, these factors may contribute to explain
why the weather is widely acknowledged to play an important role in shaping the price of
carbon.
4.2.6 Macroeconomic and financial market shocks
Based on the characteristics of the global economic context and changes in industrial
production in EU ETS sectors during 2005-2007, Alberola et al.,2008b, 2009[40] provide
the first econometric exercises deriving the correlation between production and
environmental conditions on carbon prices. As industrial production increases, associated
CO2 emissions increase, and therefore more CO2 allowances are needed by operators to
cover their emissions.
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More recently, Declercq et al., 2011[41] investigate the impact of the economic
recession on CO2 emissions in the European power sector during the years 2008 and
2009,with their simulations demonstrating that an emissions reduction of about 150 million
tons may be expected from the European power sector during the period as a consequence
of the recession.
4.2.7 Macroeconomic indicators
Interestingly, several studies uncover some econometric links between the carbon
market and several indicators related to macroeconomic and financial markets. Oberndorfer,
2009[42] has first tackled this issue from the angle of the stock markets. The author shows
that CO2 price changes and stock returns of the most important European electricity
corporations are positively related, with this effect being particularly strong for the period
of carbon market shock in early 2006. Next follows a review of the evolution of the carbon
price since the implementation of the EU ETS in 2005.
4.3 Historical evolution of Carbon prices
In the first phase of the ETS (2005–2007), the prices of tradable CO2 emission credits
were highly volatile. In retrospect, this was due to the limited time horizon of this phase, the
highly politicized process for determining the emission cap, uncertainties regarding the cost
and availability of abatement options, the mismatch between the actual and forecast demand
for emission rights, and the inelasticity of the supply of emission rights.
As mentioned above, in April 2006 the CO2 prices collapsed, firstly because of the
grandfathering of EU-ETS emission rights and secondly because the emissions cap in Phase
I (2005-07) was not strict enough to avoid the over-allocation of allowances. However, as
analysts expected a shortage at the beginning of the phase and forward prices soared to
nearly €30/t in 2006 ‘’on the back of the European Commission tightening the proposed
National Allocation Plans, high summer temperatures and increasing energy prices’’
(Wagner, 2009[43]). As soon as the economic crisis began, Phase II allowance prices
plummeted from a high of about €30/t in July 2008 to €8/t in February 2009, but with
expectations for recovery of the EU economy, EUA prices reached €13/t by mid June
2009. (Wagner, 2009[43]).
-40-
Since then carbon prices moved sideways till June the 10th, 2011 with the December
carbon contract for next-year delivery of EUA allowances which had risen by about 3 €/t
through the end of March on increased power generation from natural gas and coal, due to
Germany’s nuclear moratorium, subsequently trended downward ending June with the a
free fall of reaching its lowest point in August the 8th, 2011 of 10,63 €/t in driven by
sovereign debt problems, slow recovery from recession and climate policy uncertainty
combined with low demand for EUA emissions permits (raising doubts about the viability
of more ambitious targets).
It’s not hard to see why analysts see little optimism for any short term recovery in the
prices of EUAs or CERs. Key to the longer term price outlook is whether the EU decides to
lift its 2020 emissions reduction target from 20 per cent below 1990 levels to 25 per cent,
thus obliging emitters to cut further.
But if the target stays at 20 per cent, prices are forecast to remain in the current range of
€10 to €15, unless a new recession pushes prices off the cliff.
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CHAPTER5
5 ECONOMICS OF POWER PLANT INVESTMENTS
5.1 Introduction
We previously discussed the theory and application of emissions trading as a regulatory
mechanism, focusing on how it provides incentives for a change in economic behavior. The
subject of discussion in this chapter will be presenting the economic impacts of the EU ETS
on electricity producers in order to highlight the multitude of interrelated factors that will
shape an investment decision.
And this will take place by discussing the effects of carbon policy and consequently of
carbon price on the operational decisions of a power generator. In our opinion,
understanding these effects, which have direct impacts on the short-term profitability of
PGs, are essential in order to further understand the impact of CO2 price on long term
investment strategy.
First we will discuss about the economic surcharge for power generators caused by the
introduction of the EU ETS. Next we will investigate the effect of carbon price on the cost
of power production and electricity price, including wholesale prices and retail prices and
windfall profits. After that we will discuss the effect of carbon price on the power
generator’s windfall profits and finally we will see how carbon prices influence short-term
power plant operational strategies such as fuel switching.
5.2 CO2price economic impact on Power Generators
5.2.1 Introduction
The full extent of the economic impacts caused by emissions trading on power
generator is enormous. These impacts affect everything from dispatch order of power plants
to interest rates. The impact on the power sector takes place at two levels. Firstly, the
carbon price has been introduced in operational decisions. Anytime a ton of carbon is
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emitted in the production process, the operator compares the corresponding profit margin
for the production with the opportunity cost of selling the allowance on the market.
Secondly, the carbon price can be factored in longer term decision making - namely the
decision to invest in several abatement solutions. Should the carbon price be high enough,
decision-makers might consider it more advantageous to invest in carbon-free or less
carbon-intensive production technology. The main economic impacts of the CO2 price on
power generators will be presented in the following.
5.2.2 The effect of CO2price through trading of Allowance Expenses
To start with, the introduction of the EU ETS has created a new commodity that needs
to be managed and traded by generating stations. There are costs associated with trading
commodities (such as the costs of additional personnel/training, IT/communications,
broker’s fees and market information).
Actually the most straightforward type of impact from the CO2 price creation is the
impact from direct costs resulting from the company’s need to buy allowances which results
expenses. These costs of covering carbon emissions definitely influences future investment
decisions and generation technology choices. Most companies already reflect the allowance
cost in their daily operations and the evaluation of future investment decisions
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005[44]).
Figure 5.1 shows the imbalance between supply and demand by sectors in the EU-ETS
between 2005 and 2006. Almost all the demand for allowances to cover emissions comes
from the power and heat sector (concerning practically electricity generators). So most
electricity producers in Europe were short permits between 2005 and 2006.
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Figure 5.1: source, deBruyn, S.M., 2010 [26] .
Although electricity producers in Europe receive each year of the Phase II EU-ETS
period a free initial allocation of allowances, most of them need to procure each year
additionally vast number of permits. This results, even with conservative estimations based
on present EUA price levels huge expenditures which need to be covered. German
electricity utility RWE, reported that for each one of the years in Phase II EU-ETS period
the company is currently 60 to 70 billion EUA’s short which need to be purchased in the
market. These expenditures will skyrocket in Phase III EU-ETS period when the free
allocations period will end with the amount of EUA’s for RWE soaring to about 160 and
170 billion, affecting accordingly the operating results of the company (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: source RWE, 2010[15]
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We cannot make any conclusions on the effects of the EU ETS on investments by
looking solely at permit expenses. While these do provide a signal to reduce emissions that
is in line with economic theory, there are other factors at work. We must therefore
contemplate the electricity market as a whole to understand how it functions and how it
interplays with emissions markets in order to provide incentives for abatement.
Furthermore, permit trading can bring in also profit opportunities for a power generator
by being a physical player in a commodity market. It is likely that the large vertically
integrated generators are those most able to benefit from the opportunities of trading, and
their additional costs will be low in relation to their total fixed costs. Independent
generators will face higher costs in relation to their total fixed costs, and may be relatively
risk averse in terms of actively trading in carbon markets.
Finally there is a number of additional costs that generators will face as a result of the
introduction of the EU ETS and the carbon price. These include monitoring and verification
of emissions costs and costs spent for hiring additional personnel which is needed due to
creation by the EU ETS of an additional level of regulation.
5.2.3 The effect of CO2 price on power plant dispatch and merit
order
In a liberalized marketplace, due to low price elasticity of demand, prices are driven by
the merit order structure. The merit order method relies on a priority list that ranks the
generating units in some order of preference. With this technique a list is being generated to
rank all units according their short run marginal costs. Typically, at the bottom of the merit
order are plants with high fixed costs and low variable cost. At the top, plants with high
variable costs and low fixed cost. In most European countries the cheapest and most
efficient generators are used to generate base load which usually are nuclear, hydro, wind
and the most efficient CCGTs. Midload is generally met by coal or gas generators and peak
load may require the most expensive OCGT (Figure 5.3)
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Figure 5.3: Price formation in electricity markets, Handbook Utility Management, 2009[47]
The price of electricity is set through a single clearing-price auction. The market
operator forms total demand and supply curves and clears the market at the market clearing
price through a supply and demand equilibrium (Figure 5.3). When a plant is at the
‘’margin’’, the market price of electricity is equal to its short-run marginal costs. (the
marginal plant). Plants that are above this level do not operate and plants below are able to
make a marginal profit.
In a non-carbon constrained environment the SRMC of each plant is a function of
short-run non-fuel variable costs (operational and maintenance costs, the cost of fuel and
the generating unit’s efficiency which also determines the merit order). At any given time
therefore, the price of electricity covers the SRMC of the most expensive generator. The
same logic applies in a carbon-constrained environment, except that the cost of carbon is
built into the cost of generation for each thermal generator. A carbon price may mean
changes to the merit order as different generation technologies and fuels emit different
volumes of CO2 for each unit of electricity dispatched, for example conventional coal
stations emits nearly twice as much CO2 as combined cycle natural gas units.
Figure 5.4 shows how the introduction of a carbon price changes the merit order of
generating assets while reducing the gap in the merit order between upper base-load and
lower peak-load electricity : the nuclear plant which has no CO2 emissions is the cheapest
of all units and is first in the merit order. Furthermore the existence of a carbon price adds
more to the marginal cost of coal generation than it does to gas, making gas which burns
more cleanly the cheaper generation technology.
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Figure 5.4: The impact of the merit order in CO2 price pass-through to electricity price Source:(
Carmona,R. [46]).
Furthermore, Figure 5.5 shows a case scenario explaining the different short-run
marginal costs (SRMC) of coal and gas generation. In this case, due to higher marginal
costs of natural gas compared to coal, natural gas is at the margin and sets the short-run
price of electricity. As the price of CO2 increases, the SRMC for gas and coal increases.
However, the SRMC of coal increases at a faster rate due to carbon emissions that are
approximately double those of natural gas. In between 20-30$ per ton of CO2, coal
generation moves to the margin and begins to determine the price of electricity. It also quite
clear that at this threshold, the slope of the marginal price of electricity changes and
becomes more sensitive to changes in CO2 price.
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Figure 5.5: The impact of the merit order in CO2 price pass-through to electricity price  source,
(Blyth et al., 2007 [28]).
5.2.4 The effect of CO2price on the electricity price
One of the key elements of a cap-and-trade-system is that for an electricity generator
holding emission allowances, the production of carbon emitting power competes with the
possibility to exchange the unused allowances. This is called opportunity cost of the EUA’s,
has equal value with the CO2 market price and is therefore  being incorporated in electricity
generators’ decisions.
Several factors influence the degree that the opportunity cost of the so far free
allocated emissions allowances is reflected in the end user electricity prices .These could
be the regulatory frameworks, the elasticity of demand, the agreements between suppliers
and end-users and finally the EUA allocation rules of different governments.
Nevertheless, the economic background of a cap-and-trade system is that the carbon
emissions price should be reflected in the end user prices in order to encourage cleaner
electricity generation through higher expected profitability.
There are three obvious reasons why it is difficult to figure out safely how the EU ETS
has affected so far electricity prices. Firstly there is no united European Union electricity
market, but a fragmented market regulated by different frameworks. Secondly, there are
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additional factors which equally affect generation prices such as volatility of natural gas
prices or the use of market power by power utilities. Thirdly, no data can be collected
concerning the bidding strategies and the marginal plant supplier to the market, making  it
extremely difficult to determine the level of pass-through of CO2 prices in electricity prices.
There are some empirical studies researching the impact of EU ETS on power prices,
an overview list is shown in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Summary of empirical studies on impact of EU ETS on power prices (source Sijm, J.,
2007, [49]).
The major findings of the above empirical studies have been:
1. A significant pass-through of carbon costs to power prices was confirmed for:
 Forward markets (2005) concerning Germany, the Netherlands, the UK,
and Scandinavian countries
 Spot markets: Italy (2006) and Finland (2005-2006)
2. Empirical estimates of pass-through rates vary widely depending on:
 Country concerned
 Markets analyzed (spot/forward; peak/off-peak)
 Period considered
 Data used
 Assumptions and estimation method applied
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5.2.5 The effect of CO2price on the wholesale electricity prices
A study with empirical analyses of the trends on power, fuel and carbon markets for
nine major EU ETS countries came to the following findings Sijm et.al.,2008 [50]. In
general, forward power prices in the countries analyzed have increased significantly
between early 2005 and mid-2006, in particular for peak products.
In Germany, electricity prices increased strongly along with carbon prices since the
introduction of the EU ETS in 2005, VIK, 2006[51] as cited in Reinaud, 2007[52]. The
significant increases in forward power prices in 2005 can be largely attributed to higher fuel
prices in those cases where gas-fired plants set the price, and to a lesser extent to the pass-
through of carbon costs. On the other hand, in those cases where coal-fired stations
determine the price, increases in this price can be mainly attributed to the pass-through of
carbon costs (and hardly to higher fuel prices as the price of coal has hardly increased in
2005).
On the spot markets, it is more difficult to find a clear correlation between changes in
the power prices on the one hand and changes in the fuel and/or carbon costs on the other
hand, mainly due to the incidence of other factors affecting the power price on these
markets, such as extreme or rapidly changing weather patterns, plant outages or other
factors causing major fluctuations in market scarcity in the short term. Sijm et.al(2008).
Over a relatively short period, which applies particularly for the period March-mid July
2005, when CO2 prices on the EU ETS market increased steadily from about 10 to 30
€/tCO2 (with a correlation of 0.98) and in April-May 2006, when CO2 prices collapsed
suddenly from approximately 30 to 10-15 €/t CO2, the link between CO2 prices and power
prices is occasionally very clear. Between July and December 2005, the carbon market had
a sideways trend and the correlation was less distinct.
The low correlation between CO2 prices and power prices between July and December
2005 (Fig 5.6) and more generally over longer time periods implies that the relationship
between carbon and power prices is less clear, most likely because over longer time periods
power prices are affected by other factors besides fuel and carbon costs, such as changes in
market structure or generation capacities (Sijm et.al, 2008[50]).
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Figure 5.6: Correlation between Base-load Electricity Prices and CO2 Allowance Prices in
Germany, source: VIK 2006[51].
Moreover, after the collapse of the carbon price in April/May 2006 and, particularly,
during the latter part of 2006 (when both carbon and gas prices declined steadily), the
correlation between power prices and fuel/carbon costs is obviously r less clear implying
that other factors - such as growing capacity shortages or market power - have become
more important in affecting power prices.
The effects of the drop in CO2 prices on the day-ahead prices in May 2006 clearly
demonstrate the reality of the pass-through. Carbon prices dropped by more than 50 percent
mid-May2006 upon reports that the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, the Netherlands and
the Walloon region emitted far less CO2 in 2005 than initially anticipated by the market (
Figure 5.7). Consequently, power prices on the European market exchanges dropped. A
€10/t fall in the price of EU allowances was immediately followed by a drop in electricity
prices of at least 5-10 €/MWh in Europe (PointCarbon, 2009[31]).
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Figure 5.7: Electricity and CO2 Prices between January 2004 and July 2006, source: Reinaud,
2007[52].
5.2.6 The effect of CO2price on the electricity retail prices
Sijm et.al,2008 [50] states that power prices on retail markets in EU ETS countries
have increased significantly over 2004-2006. If it is assumed that over the period 2004-
2006 changes in the retail power spreads - defined as retail power prices excluding taxes
and fuel costs - are only due to carbon costs passed through, the impact of the EU ETS on
retail power prices was still relatively low in 2005 due to relatively low year-ahead carbon
prices in 2004 and, perhaps, some constraints in passing through these costs to retail prices.
Moreover, if it is assumed that the carbon costs passed through on the retail market are
similar to the carbon costs passed through on the wholesale market, the impact of these
costs - and, consequently, of the EU ETS - on retail power prices becomes generally even
more significant. Wagner R., 2009[43] argues that rising energy prices showed after the
imposed deregulation as expected the way up to the r household power prices and as can be
derived from Figure 5.8, the introduction of the EU ETS just led to a continuation of the
trend to higher retail prices but not to acceleration.
Both agree that retail prices are only influenced to a minor extent by CO2-prices with
household prices being more dependent on other cost components than the power
generation costs including high energy taxes and high distribution or other marketing costs
which mainly determine retail power prices.
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Figure 5.8: Retail electricity prices in EU, source: Wagner, R., 2009[43].
5.2.7 CO2 price and Cost Pass-through to Consumers
As supported by economic theory and empirical evidence, power producers in
competitive electricity markets pass through (part of) the opportunity cost of CO2 emissions
trading, even if they receive carbon allowances for free. This is known as the pass-through
rate. Sijm et.al, 2006[27] state that from a climate policy perspective, passing through the
costs of CO2 emissions is a rational and intended effect, enhancing the efficiency of
emissions trading by giving incentives to end-users to reduce their consumption of carbon
intensive goods.
Sijm et.al, 2006[27] further distinguish between the behavior of individual electricity
producers and the market as a whole in what they call "add-on" and "work-on" rates. The
add-on rate is the margin that is added to marginal bids in order to cover additional carbon
costs. In a liberalized market, the market works through a single clearing-price auction and
generation companies can accomplish the full pass-through of marginal costs. In a regulated
market, companies are only able to pass additional carbon costs to the degree allowed by
the regulator. Sijm et.al, 2006[27] estimated that the average pass-through rates varied from
40 percent to 70 percent depending on the country and whether it was a peak or off-peak
demand period. The work-on rate is the result of effects in the market due to demand-
response. Sijm et.al, 2006[27] found that electric producers absorbed a part of additional
carbon costs when elasticity was high (Sijm et.al, 2006[27]). Whatever the effect of CO2
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costs on wholesale electricity prices, the effect on retail customers depends on the degree of
liberalization in retail markets.
5.2.8 CO2 price and the issue of windfall profits
Intense public criticism has been caused from the issue of “windfall profits” which
refers to the higher electricity prices and consequent higher corporate profits that resulted
from the fact that freely obtained allowances were passed through in prices, especially in
peak prices instead of investing to innovation to provide clean, renewable energy. (Figure
5.9). As it was shown in a liberalized market under free allocation, companies tend to pass
carbon costs to consumers even if they were receiving them for free (Sijm et.al, 2006[27]).
European power companies will gain an additional 23-63 billion euro in windfall
profits between 2008 and 2012 with the highest levels of windfall profits for Germany and
UK due to the high level of pass-through as well as the relatively high level of emission
intensity of marginal plant. (Point Carbon, 2008b [53]).
Figure 5.9: Windfall profits in electricity sector, source deBruyn, S.M., 2010, CE Delft, 2010 [26].
Freely allocated allowances will have a very different effect on electricity prices
depending on the degree of liberalization in each member country. Whether an electricity
generator in a competitive market has received the allowances for free or not, the relevant
consideration in participating in the electricity market is the opportunity cost of using the
allowance to cover emissions. Since every allowance used to cover emissions means the
loss of the opportunity to sell that allowance. an opportunity cost is incurred and that cost
which is reflected in the marginal price of electricity. Whether allowances are distributed
for free or through an auction will typically have no effect on market prices in competitive
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electricity markets, although it will affect individual supplier profitability, Ellerman,
Joskow, 2008[54]).
Starting in 2013, the electricity sector will move to full auctioning. Auctions will
change the availability of current and future allowances in the market, affecting carbon
prices. The trend towards further liberalization is likely to continue to the extent that most
European markets are likely to be sufficiently competitive by 2013 to allow wholesale
electricity prices to be determined on a short run marginal cost basis incorporating the full
cost of carbon allowances. Even in a scenario where existing, partly liberalized regulatory
and pricing frameworks are maintained to 2013 a switch from free allocation of allowances
to full auctioning would have a small impact (New Carbon Finance, 2008[55]).
Furthermore, auctioning would ensure that carbon prices are passed through into retail
prices where electricity markets have not been liberalized and it would raise substantial
revenue for the government that could be used for other purposes some of which could
improve efficiency.
In a liberalized market under free allocation, companies have shown to pass carbon
costs to consumers even if they were receiving them for free (windfall profits) (Sijm et.al,
2006[27]). This is because there is an opportunity cost in generating electricity. Companies
have a stock of allowances for which they have the option of selling in the market. By
generating electricity, they are forgoing this opportunity. Carbon permits are added to the
marginal price of electricity to take this into account, even if they receive them for free.
Because of this, European power companies will gain an additional 23-71 billion euro in
windfall profits between 2008 and 2012 (Point Carbon, 2008b [53]).
The electricity sector will move to full auctioning as soon as Phase III sets off..
Auctions will change the availability of current and future allowances in the market,
definitely affecting carbon prices. The structure of auctioning systems is still to be
determined by the individual countries.
5.3 The effect of CO2 price on the generation composition
portfolio
The composition of generating portfolios will determine the exposure of utilities to
market fluctuations. Firms can be hedged by diversifying their generating portfolio to the
point where market risk is equal to that of a market portfolio representing the general
economy. Plants have technology-specific risks due to the price risk from fuel and carbon
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market. There are also risks from changes in the merit order which affect the ability of
individual plants to pass carbon costs onto electricity prices.
The exposure of a firm's generating portfolio to the carbon market can be obtained by
calculating plant emissions relative to the market in which the firm participates.
5.4 Short-Term CO2 Abatement in the power sector
In the context of this chapter assessing the economic impacts of carbon price on the
operational decisions of power generators, we will discuss in this section about the short-
term carbon abatement choices such companies have at their disposal while optimizing their
cash-flows, although short-term switching conditions do not actually refer to new
investments but only consider shifts in plant utilization. We will come back to discuss these
options by introducing the factor of timing and postponement of power plant investment
decisions using the real options approach in chapter 7.6.3.
As pre-mentioned in section 2.3. emissions reductions in the power sector can be
achieved by means of short-term operational adjustments (like fuel switching to a lower
carbon content combustion fuel), investments in less carbon-emitting technologies
(retrofitting power plants with carbon capture and storage or closure of power plants
running on high polluting fuels and investing in a plant that emit less like renewable energy,
gas or nuclear power, or by decreasing the power plant (and consequently the emissions)
output.
The choice to switch fuels has been a predominant short-term strategy for power
producers. The spark and dark spread is the most important determinant factor in the choice
to switch fuels. Switching can be accomplished at the individual plant level, company level
and sector level. For individual companies, the choice to switch is made on a cost-basis and
changes day-to-day and hour-to-hour according to the dark and spark spreads. In order to
have a better assessment of the potential impact of CO2 emissions trading on forward power
prices, fuel costs have been subtracted from these prices, resulting in the so-called ‘power
spreads.
The spread is the theoretical gross margin of a power plant selling one unit of
electricity and buying fuel at a certain price. It is calculated by taking the price of electricity
and subtracting the cost of fuel multiplied by the heat rate needed to produce one unit of
power. The spark spread is given by:
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Spark Spread = Price of Electricity - [ (Cost of Gas) x (HeatRate)]
Equation 5.1: Spark spread
Spark spreads are a measure of the profitability of gas plants, while dark spreads show
the profitability of coal plants. When there are tight spreads in the market, only the most
efficient plants will be dispatched. When the cost of carbon allowances is included, these
are referred to as the “clean" dark and spark spreads.
Spark spread can also be used to assess the loss of revenue if a power station is
switched from a normal running scenario to one where it is held in reserve to provide power
when a large number of renewable generators, is unable to generate. In such a case the
power station operator would be indifferent to such non-running as long as he was paid the
spread it would have earned otherwise. When the cost of carbon allowances is included in
the calculations, these are referred to as the clean dark and clean spark spreads.
The figures 5.10 and 5.11 below show how the “clean” spark and dark spreads affected
gas and coal generation in the summer of 2007.
Figure 5.10: The inverse relationship between European Union Allowances (EUA) and coal profits
is evident. Increases in EUA prices in the summer of 2007 were enough to sink the profits of coal
producers by approximately one third (Point Carbon,  2008a[56]).
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Figure 5.11: The sustained increase in the EUA price after April of 2007 raised the prοfitability of
gas-fired generators above coal for a large part of the year (PointCarbon, 2008a[56]).
5.4.1 Fuel Switching price
For a coal-fired and a gas-fired plant with given dark spread and spark spread
respectively, the calculated CO2 value which is necessary to switch these plants in the merit
order, is called the switching point (Sijm et al. 2005[57]). This reflects the value that would
equalize the profitability of a gas fired power production and a coal fired power production.
The formula for calculating the switching price is the following:
Equation 5.2: Switching price
where, ρ represents the thermal efficiency of a power plant and E the emissions and
is given in terms of tons of CO2 emitted per MWh of electricity produced.
The switching price is fundamental in carbon credit pricing because the marginal cost
of a credit should in theory follow the switching price.
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The first condition in order to pursue fuel switching derives from an economic point of
view. More specifically, by switching from coal to gas, a power generator will need to
acquire less allowances or eventually be able to sell a percentage of them.
A second condition for switching concerns the technical potential of a power generator.
With the increase of carbon prices, power generators are endangered with facing negative
clean dark spreads and will be forced to switch fuel ,assuming obviously either that they
have the capacity to switch or that they have both types of generation plants in their
portfolio. Obermayer, 2010[58] analysed data series and calculated switching prices
meeting the conclusion that the switching price is a quite poor indicator of the EUA price.
Figure 5.12: Implicit EUA switch price necessary for fuel switching from coal to gas-fired power
generation. (Source: Obermayer,, 2010[58]).
With different data sets and sources, this plot will look a little bit different. In any case,
we see that switching price is of little help in determining a fundamental value of EUAs.
EUA carbon credits must therefore be seen as an independent asset class, and are not priced
according to the fundamentals theory. Another observation is that EUA prices are relatively
stable compared with the actuating switching price. One reason for this is that switching
price is a too much simple model for interpreting such a complex market as carbon credits.
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There are many more market forces at play which can severely impact price, than those
presented in this model.
Delarue et al.,2008[59] came to similar conclusions : He documented via modeling that
the decision of whether the utilization of any new plant via fuel switching will warrant the
investment given expected fuel and CO2 prices over the lifespan of the intended investment
must take into account the highly complex relationships between load, fuel and EUA prices.
There is no single constant relationship between the price of CO2 and abatement but for any
given hour with given load and fuel prices, the expected rising relationship between price
and abatement can be observed. However, as soon as we move long-term (days, weeks,
years), the constancy of the relationship is not valid anymore. Thus, the quantity of
abatement from fuel switching that will be obtained for given prices of CO2 are heavily
dependent on the actual hourly load, which varies significantly over daily, weekly, and
seasonal cycles, and on the relative price of natural gas and coal, which varies on a daily
basis.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows how the EU ETS affects the operations and earnings of power
generators. The impact of the EU ETS is felt in many different parts of the business
although the existence of a carbon price does not guarantee that abatement will take place.
There are other factors in the market which will change the ultimate impact of emissions
trading. E.g., the merit order and the aspects influencing its structure provide a better tool
for looking at the dynamics of power plant portfolios. The technology that is at the margin
sets the marginal price and thus is able to pass any additional costs to the electricity price.
As the price of electricity increases, coal power plants could move to the margin which
would have the effect of increasing the sensitivity of the electricity to the CO2 price and
shift the full cost of CO2 permits to consumers.
Another factor that was discussed was the regulatory structure of the market. In a
liberalized market, there will be a greater degree of freedom to pass additional costs to
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consumers. This has already been observed in markets like Germany, where the electricity
price has become strongly correlated with the price of CO2.
The risks that the carbon market brings in to electricity producers cannot be ignored.
There is a range of factors that producers take into consideration outside of the cost
mechanism.
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CHAPTER6
6 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SIMULATE FUEL, CARBON
AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
6.1 Introduction
The most important uncertainties concerning power plant investments have to do with
the future contribution margins issued by new power plants which for the most part depend
on the future values of fuel, carbon and electricity prices. Such forward prices of gas, coal
and electricity are practically available only for a period of 36 months , which is the reason
that utilities are forced to make assumptions of the future development of the market price.
Furthermore, market participants are aware that it is unacceptable to limit the valuation of
the commodity forward contracts to the duration of the active market period.
Energy commodity prices have characteristics not encountered in the financial markets.
The volatility of the price of oil, natural gas and especially electricity is a lot larger than that
of currencies, interest rates and equities, especially in our present turbulent financial times.
Energy prices often exhibit mean reversion, seasonality, sharp and asymmetric spikes that
require the development of advanced price models.
Basically, there are different stochastic processes available in order to describe
potential future prices of commodities with the two most common used for energy price
modeling being the geometric Brownian motion (GBM) and the mean-reverting process
although there is no consensus in literature which approach is appropriate. Despite their
relative simplicity they are frequently used to model fossil fuel prices. Both processes are
based on the fact that the future price depends only on the current price, while older prices
are irrelevant for future prices.
In order to capture uncertainties associated with prices a stochastic process is discussed
for electricity prices, fossil fuel prices and carbon allowance prices.
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6.2 Modeling the price of fuel
Early works in the field of fuel price modeling are often based on GBM.. When fuel
prices are used as an input parameter for fundamental electricity market models, the
approaches that are most commonly used to simulate fuel prices are GBMs (e.g., Botterud,
2003[60]) or mean-reverting processes.
Even though a wide variety of fuel price forecasting models exist, the quality of
forecasts derived from these models is often disputable. Manera at al.,2007[61] presented a
review of different models used to forecast oil prices where he found that there is no
consensus. Findings vary across models, time periods and data frequencies. The authors
conclude that the best performing econometric model for oil forecasts is yet to be presented
in literature. While the above paper surveyed oil price models, the results are most probably
also applicable to gas price models as found in many countries e.g. Germany.
Summarizing the results of the literature on fuel price forecasting, two things should be
kept in mind. First, a perfect forecast model does not exist and second, even if the
appropriate stochastic process for a fuel price model could be identified, the forecasts might
still differ depending on the historical data used to estimate the parameters of the process.
Furthermore, a growing number of experts claim that the price of crude oil nowadays is
impossible to forecast as it is not set exclusively according to the traditional relation of
supply to demand, but is instead to a big extent controlled by an elaborate financial market
system as well as by major oil companies. Perhaps as much as 60% of today’s crude oil
price is pure speculation driven by large trader banks and hedge funds (F. William Engdahl,
2008 [62] ). These findings emphasize the importance to consider a wide variety of
different fuel price scenarios in a power plant investment model.
6.3 Modeling Carbon Prices
6.3.1 Introduction
The uncertainty concerning the development of the emissions allowances price can
influence the profitability of power plants which act under the EU ETS and thus is an
important factor for investment decisions in carbon-abatement technologies. Consequently
the determination of the carbon price risk is a necessary prerequisite to make concrete
decisions regarding investment alternatives. Furthermore, electricity is generated by a
mixture of different technologies, which differ considerably with respect to their technical
characteristics and which are influenced in their generation profitability by carbon prices.
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Recent empirical papers help explain the evolution of past prices on the European carbon
market (see section 4.3 ), but the little carbon price history makes it difficult to simply rely
on this literature for prospective investment decision-making. The choice of the relevant
approach for modeling the carbon as an underlying asset must help in the long-term
irreversible decision making.
6.3.2 Literature Review
Knowledge of the statistical distribution of emission trading allowances becomes
crucial in setting strategies in the carbon market. Only a few models for CO2 price
simulation exist because of the recent history of the emission trading system. Most of the
existing models take into account spot prices.
Paolella and Taschini, 2006 [63] analyzed the CO2 emission allowance spot prices
while discussing forecast methods based on the analysis of a variety of factors, including
analysis of supply and demand fundamentals and also based on the spot-future parity.
They showed that these two approaches lead to implausible conclusions due,
respectively, to the complexity of the market and to the particular behavior of the emission
allowance commodity. To be more specific, concerning the first approach, Paolella and
Taschini examine whether fuel prices can be used as a proxy for CO2 prices with the
authors report that the fuel price level does not fully explain the CO2 price level in 2005.
According to the second approach Paolella and Taschini claim that the spot-forward parity
approach is, inadequate due to the inconsistent behavior of the CO2 emission allowance
convenience yield (which depends on the political uncertainties that largely affect long
futures maturities). As an alternative, Paolella and Taschini propose different GARCH
models.
Benz and Trueck, 2009[64] analyzed the short-term spot price dynamics of CO2
emission allowances by investigating several approaches for modeling the returns of
emission allowances while They identified stylized facts of European carbon prices like
mean-reversion, jumps and spikes, and heteroskedastic volatility and upon this they
investigated the adequacy of different stochastic models for CO2 allowance logreturns.
They first showed that current approaches for CO2 price scenario delineation are not
sufficient because the fundamentals analysis based on few market components overlooks
the complexity of the variables that come into play. Due to different phases of price and
volatility behavior in the returns, they suggested the use of AR-GARCH models for
stochastic modeling.
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Dannenberg and Ehrenfeld, 2008[65] assume that carbon prices fluctuate around the
expected marginal abatement costs and propose to model carbon spot prices with a mean-
reverting process. By introducing the price jumps Dannenberg and Ehrenfeld took into
consideration the effects of new information that can significantly change the expectations
of marginal abatement costs.
Daskalakis et al., 2009[66] analyze spot and future prices of different markets within
the EU ETS which are NordPool, PowerNext and the European Climate Exchange (ECX).
Their empirical analysis indicated that emission allowance spot prices are likely to be
characterized by jumps and non-stationary behavior. The writers tested six different
stochastic processes which have shown best results for a GBM with jumps. In addition to
spot prices, Daskalakis et al. examined two different types of futures: intra-period futures
and inter-period futures. The maturity of intra-period futures is within the same emission
allowances trading phase in which they are first traded. The maturity of inter-period futures
is not in the same phase in which they are first traded While intra-period futures evolved
closely with spot prices, there were significant deviations for inter-period futures. Inter-
period future prices are reported to be higher and less volatile than those of intra-period
futures. A possible explanation for that observation is the prohibition of banking of
emission allowances between phase I and phase II of the EU ETS.
In a policy-oriented study of investments under climate policy uncertainty, Blyth et
al.(2007) [67] and Yang et al. (2008) [68] model the price of carbon as a Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM). Yang and Blyth (2007) [69] further improve their modeling of
carbon price by simulating possible carbon price shocks that would represent policy-related
events by adding a jump feature to the stochastic modeling (only once in ten years from
when the initial investment decision can be first taken). The GBM is fitted using a mix of
IEA projections and judgmental input. This study will be further discussed in chapter 8.
The brief literature review shows that a consequence of the relatively short existence of
the EU ETS is the absence of established price forecasting models especially for long-term
price forecasts which are required for power generation expansion models. Therefore, most
power generation expansion models use either deterministic carbon prices (which means
that the investor does know what the future prices will be ) (e.g., Sun et al.,2008 [70]) or
consider different predefined scenarios within the optimization.
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6.4 Modeling electricity prices
6.4.1 Modeling electricity prices as stochastic processes
6.4.1.1 Introduction
For any type of power plant valuation an indispensable input are electricity prices in
order to valuate investments and profitability, as the revenues generated by power plants
strongly depend on them, thus the determination of the electricity price is of great
importance.
There are two different approaches to model electricity prices. They can either be
modeled as a stochastic process, similar to the way fuel prices are commonly modeled.
Alternatively, a fundamental electricity market model can be used to determine electricity
prices depending on the current fuel prices, electricity demand and electricity supply. The
most commonly used investment models in literature are based on fundamental electricity
market models as these are better suited to consider the relationship between fuel prices,
carbon prices and the existing power generation portfolio on the one side and electricity
prices and electricity production on the other side.
6.4.1.2 Literature Review on stochastic process models
No consensus about the best applicable method derived from the review. Deng,
2005[71] proposes three different mean-reverting jump-diffusion processes for modeling
electricity spot price. Deng includes in these models an additional process, which may be
correlated with the electricity prices. This other process can be the spot fuel prices or the
electricity demand. To account for short periods of high electricity prices, which may be
caused by forced plant outages, Deng extends the basic model to a regime-switching model.
This extended model allows to switch between normal states and high price states.
Burger et al.,2004 [72] develop a model considering seasonality, mean-reversion, price
spikes and price-dependent volatilities. Their model is a three-factor model consisting of a
stochastic load process, a short-term process and a long-term process. While the stochastic
load process combined with the deterministic supply function represents the part of the
price explained by fundamental data, the short-term and long-term process are used to
account for price determinants like psychological facts or the behavior of speculators.
Geman and Roncoroni, 2006 [73] introduce a “jump-reversion” component in their spot
price model to account for price jumps. They define two different states based on a
threshold value. If the current price is below the threshold, only positive jumps can occur.
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While if the price is above, only negative jumps are possible. The intensity of the jumps
may be time-dependent. As this short literature review indicates, there are many different
stochastic processes used to model electricity prices most of which have in common the
inclusion of fundamentals to improve price forecasts.
6.4.2 Modeling Electricity Prices with Fundamental Models
Fundamental electricity market models calculate the cost-minimal electricity
production for the considered market which can be used to determine the electricity
production of each unit as well as electricity prices. The main advantage of fundamental
electricity market models compared to simulation models is the more appropriate
consideration of the relationship between fuel prices, electricity demand and electricity
supply on the one side and electricity production and electricity prices on the other side.
Depending on the type of fundamental market model, they can also consider short-term
uncertainties, e.g., the feed-in from wind power, as well as technical restrictions of power
plants like reduced load efficiency. For these reasons, we argue that fundamental electricity
market models are best suited to model electricity prices for the valuation of power plant
investments although they face several difficulties, which are be mentioned in the
following:
 Most fundamental electricity market models rely on the assumption of a competitive
market which is still not the case nowadays for most European countries, not only
regarding markets like the greek energy market which needs a long way to go to
accomplish deregulation but for most evolved markets like the german energy
market as well.
 In order to be able to make long-term price forecasts, assumptions about future
market conditions like fuel prices or the existing power plant mix must be made
which is a difficult task.
 Fundamental electricity market models cause a high computational burden.
 There is no data availability. While the data required for stochastic process models
(financial and econometric ) is in general available in public (e.g., historical
electricity prices), the exact technical parameters of power plants are often not
publicly known.
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In the following, we briefly describe three different kinds of fundamental electricity
market models, which can be used to determine the contribution margins of new units for an
investment model.
 Load–duration curve (LDC):
Fundamental models based on the LDC are the simplest type of fundamental
models. The LDC for a whole year is used to determine the corresponding
electricity production and prices. LDC models do not consider any technical
constraints.
 Supply–demand curves (SDC):
These models use several different SDCs to determine electricity prices. As the
models based on the LDC, these models do not consider technical constraints.
However, models based on the SDC can consider a price elastic demand.
 Linear programming (LP) models:
These models describe the power generation as an LP problem while having the
possibility to model technical constraints like minimum operation or minimum
shut-down restrictions. Furthermore, short-term uncertainties like the demand or
the feed-in from wind power can be considered. The disadvantage of such models
is the enormous computational burden.
6.5 Conclusions
Taking into consideration the risks to which power plant investments are exposed
which are fuel, carbon, and electricity price uncertainty as well as uncertainty about the
legal framework, in this section we described different approaches to simulate fuel, carbon
and electricity prices. There are a wide variety of different stochastic processes used for the
simulation of these prices, and there is no consensus in literature which approach is
appropriate. In our opinion, the difficulties related to fuel and carbon price modeling lead to
consideration of a wide variety of different scenarios.
As the different risks are highly interrelated, it is important that this relationship is
captured by the method used to determine future contribution margins for new units, with
the fundamental electricity market model proving best suited for this purpose.
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Furthermore we presented briefly three different kinds of fundamental electricity
market models, which can be used to determine the contribution margins of new units for an
investment model. In general, the LDC model tends to underestimate prices in times of high
load periods, while it overestimates prices during low load periods. On the other side, the
advantage of electricity market models based on an LP formulation is their ability to
consider technical restrictions of plants as well as uncertainty.
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CHAPTER7
7 VALUATION OF POWER PLANT INVESTMENTS UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
7.1 Introduction
In the previous sections we have described the risks to which power plant investments
are exposed and how these affect operational decisions. We have concluded that the
uncertainties discussed have a strong influence on the profitability of power plants
investments which have to be considered by power plant valuation methods. In this section
we will introduce a few of the valuation methods that investment companies typically use to
make their investment decisions.
According to Yang and Blyth, 2007 [69] investments in the power utility industry show
three important characteristics: Firstly, they are more or less irreversible. Secondly, the
future prices of inputs (e.g. fuel, emissions) and outputs (electricity) are influenced by
uncertainty, which could have a major impact on a company’s financial performance.
Thirdly, investment decisions can be made under flexible timing conditions. Thus, a good
project evaluation and investment methodology should quantitatively satisfy all the three
above mentioned characteristics : irreversibility, uncertainty and flexibility.
As mentioned above, in regulated energy markets, the costs of power supply are
practically transferred to end consumers, guaranteeing that all costs could be principally
recovered . In liberalized markets, on the contrary, it is necessary to optimize profitability
(i.e., revenues minus costs) and risks, rather than only to minimize cost.
Therefore short-term and long-term investment strategies are needed which can be
selected by adopting different decision rules.The concept tool box of the decision-maker
includes different methods which can be applied for this task, on one side there are simple
methods like the DCF, the levelized cost and the screening curve analysis, on the other side
more sophisticated methods like the real options method which require a strong
mathematical background.
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The real options approach, which is a method developed for investments under
uncertainty, became popular to evaluate power plant investments in a deregulated market,
which contrary to the LCOE approach, it takes the timing of investments into consideration.
In the following, we first give a brief overview of the power plant decision factors for
an investment strategy, then we will describe the DCF analysis, the LCOE method and the
screening curve method. Furthermore, we refer to more sophisticated approaches
introducing the real options approach and provide a review of power generation expansion
planning modeling techniques .Finally we introduce a literature review on the impact of
EU ETS on investment decisions.
7.2 Power plant decision factors for an investment strategy
The EU ETS provides a driver for investment in lower carbon intensity generation. To
this extent it should encourage investment in existing plant to reduce carbon intensity.
According to IPA Energy, 2003 [95], a brief overview of a number of ways of reducing
carbon intensity from a technical point of view follows :
 Fuel Switching within plant
Some plants have dual fuel capability, and so can reduce carbon intensity by
switching fuel. Although it would be possible to retrofit dual firing with gas at coal
stations, there is a relatively large cost associated with such adaptations and
connection to the gas transmission grid. In addition, the reductions in carbon
intensity are much lower than those that would arise from the construction of a new
CCGT.
 Fuel Switching within a Generation Portfolio
Most of the portfolio generators have a mix of generation technologies within their
generation fleet. Portfolio generators will constantly optimize the running time
within their portfolio in response to changing demand, outages and commodity
prices. Thus, the EU ETS simply provides an additional parameter that should be
taken into account within this optimization procedure, and should not lead to
increased administrative costs.
 Investment in New Generation Capacity
A key response to the EU ETS will be through investment in new generation
capacity with lower carbon intensity. New CCGT plants are expected to replace a
huge capacity of coal plants projected to become uneconomic over Phase II through
a combination of changing commodity prices and the EU ETS. Further new
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generation capacity is expected to be required to replace nuclear plant capacity
expected to close over Phase II, as well as to meet underlying demand growth.
While the EU ETS will not provide the primary driver for these latter investments,
the existence of a price for carbon emissions will provide an incentive to minimize
the carbon intensity of any new generation.
 Improvements in Generation Efficiency
Although in theory it may be possible to improve generation efficiency at some
stations, the high fuel component in the marginal cost of generation has meant that
the power sector has always been extremely focused on maximizing the efficiency
of plant, although it has to be accepted that there is often a trade-off between
optimizing efficiency and maintaining plant flexibility (for peaking plant, the
ability to respond quickly and having low fixed costs to spread over short periods
of generation may be more important than efficiency of generation). Thus, it is
unlikely that significant improvements in generation efficiency of existing plant
will be made as a direct response to the EU ETS.
 Investment in JI/CDM Projects
Investment in JI/CDM projects could give players access to cheaper emissions
credits from abroad (CERs and ERUs). It is likely that this route may be pursued by
some of the large pan-European utilities, but this has not been investigated in detail
in this report.
7.3 The discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and the ‘’NPV-rule’’
The classical and simplest way to assess an investment is based on the assumption that
power players will decide the optimal strategy on the basis of a the discounted cash flow
(DCF) method: The DCF valuation method consists in discounting to present value all the
future cash flows minus the initial investment outlay, and in accumulating them to find the
net present value (NPV) of the investment. Corporate finance textbooks present the “NPV
rule” as the key to making investment decisions: any investment with a positive NPV is a
good investment and should be pursued. (A.Damodaran, 2011, [74]).
In the presence of uncertainty, a risk premium may be imposed on the NPV calculation
by employing a risk-adjusted discount rate, and appropriate sensitivity and scenario
analyses may be performed.
-72-
As discount factor, the firm’s weighted average cost of capital may be used. The
general formulation of the NPV is as follows:
Equation 7.1: Net Present Value
with Rt equal to the returns in year t, Io the initial investment, L a possible salvage
value, r the discount rate and T the life of the project. The NPV decision rule for an
independent investment is accepted if the NPV is positive. If one among of several mutually
exclusive investments has to be chosen, the one with the highest NPV has to be collected.
The NPV can be seen as the value of an investment giving information about the minimum
return without considering uncertainty.
In addition, the expected internal rate of return (IRR) is often also calculated, indi-
cating the (implicit) discount rate that yields an NPV of zero. This is then compared with
some hurdle rate imposed by the investor for a particular type of project that makes sure
that the risk taken does not lead to a reduction in the investor’s credit rating, as this would
raise the cost of debt financing (Gross et al., 2007[16]).
As far as power plant investments are concerned, according to this methodology, the
decision to switch from a given power generation technology to another should be
undertaken whenever the present value of the profits generated by less polluting technology
exceed the present value of the profits of the more carbon intensive one .
Many power companies run detailed models of the electricity system they are
considering making an investment, with major generation plant represented. Such models
may be used to assess possible financial outcomes, hence risks, by either generating a set of
NPVs from a set of discrete scenarios and/or a by generating a spread of NPVs using a
stochastic approach. As analyzed in chapter the major variables that affect the financial
performance of the power plant include utilization, fuel prices,CO2 prices, electricity prices
and the value of support mechanisms such as the RO. The impact of investment behavior of
other players in the market may also be incorporated.
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7.4 The Levelized cost valuation method of electricity
generation
This is a widely used approach for comparing electricity generation costs. Many studies
have been published in recent years that have relied on this method,(see Royal Academy of
Engineering, 2004[75]).
The majority of day-to-day investment decisions in the power sector involve choosing
the least-cost solution that takes into consideration all realistic alternatives able to satisfy
the project objectives ( Khatib, 2003[76]). To calculate abatement costs a method of
comparing technologies on an adjusted basis has to be implemented. Technologies have
different usage profiles and lifetimes which makes direct comparison difficult.. The method
by which this is done is known as LCOE or Levelized Cost of Electricity. LCOE is widely
accepted and adopted by the IEA, US Department of Energy and the UK government
(Gross et al., 2007[16]).
The levelized cost approach is a specific case of DCF analysis, which reverses the
procedure: given the objective of zero economic profit, the required annual revenues are
calculated so that the present value of all revenues exactly balances the present value of
project costs. The levelized cost methodology inherited from the pre-liberalization times has
been a useful tool for investors and for overall economic analysis because it evaluated costs
and energy production and discounted them to take account of the time value of money.
In this method the cost per kWh of electricity or the annual cost of owning and
operating a generating plant is calculated to compare different technologies. The LCOE is
based on the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis.. In this method the required annual
average costs of an electricity generating system in € /MWh are calculated including all the
discounted costs that occur over its lifetime: initial investment, operations and maintenance,
cost of fuel, discount rate and is very useful in calculating the costs of generation from
different sources. They are calculated in such a way that the NPV of a possible power plant
investment is zero. The LCOE are defined as (see, e.g., IEA 2010[77] ).
Equation 7.2: LCOE
with It = Investment expenditures in year t [e],
Mt = Operation and maintenance expenditures in year t [e],
Ft = Fuel expenditures in year t [e],
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Ct = Emission allowance expenditures in year t [e],
Et = Electricity production in year t [MWh],
r = Discount rate,
n = System lifetime.
The evaluation of different investment alternatives demands the calculation of the
LCOE for each investment alternative while the project with the lowest LCOE is the finally
chosen one.
An example of an LCOE calculation is shown in figure (IEA, Projected Costs of
Generating Electricity 2010 Edition, executive summary [77] ) : where the results are
plotted after a study which was carried out by IEA focused on the expected plant-level costs
of baseload electricity generation by power plants that could be commissioned by 2015. The
study concerns 111 plants (34 coal-fired power plants without carbon capture, 14 coal‑fired
power plants with carbon capture, 27 gas‑fired plants, 20 nuclear plants, 18 onshore wind
power plants, 8 offshore wind plants, 14 hydropower plants, 17 solar photovoltaic plants, 20
combined heat and power (CHP) plants using various fuels and 18 plants based on other
fuels or technologies) from 16 OECD member countries. With the most important
assumptions being a low real discount rate 5% and a carbon price of USD 30 /t CO2.
Figure 7.1: Regional ranges of LCOE for nuclear, coal, gas and onshore wind power plants at 5%
discount rate (source: IEA, 2010 [77]).
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From Figures 7.1 and 7.2 the following derives that competition in electricity markets
for baseload generation is today split between nuclear energy and natural gas-fired
combined cycle power generation, with coal-fired power generation not being competitive
once carbon pricing is introduced.
Figure 7.2: Carbon Pricing and the competitiveness of nuclear energy in OECD Europe : LCOE of
different generation technologies at 7% discount rate, source OECD 2011,[12].
Similar to our remarks about the application restrictions of the NPV method, the LCOE
concept too was a popular method for project valuation in regulated markets being
sufficient to minimize costs but not able to optimize returns and risks which is necessary in
liberalized markets. In the presence of uncertainty, appropriate sensitivity and scenario
analyses must be performed in order for the decision-makers to understand the tendencies
which lead to the best possible investment decisions. Figure 6.3 shows the sensitivities of
two reference technologies; nuclear which has low fuel costs and high capital costs and a
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) which has high fuel cost and low capital cost. As the
parameters are changed, significant differences in the generating costs comes to light.
Figure 3.10 illustrates that at relatively high capital cost, low fuel cost technology is
sensitive to variation in discount rate and insensitive to fuel price variation. The opposite is
true for a low capital cost, high fuel cost technology. The key message however, is that
even if there is some agreement over the construction and operating costs of particular
technologies, wide variations in levelized cost estimates can result from the other factors –
and that these factors will affect cost estimates in different ways depending on the
characteristics of the technologies.
A discount rate raise from 5 to 10% makes the electricity generation costs in the
nuclear plant to rise higher than in the CCGT. On the contrary, if fuel price is raised by 20
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% the electricity generation in the CCGT becomes not feasible compared with the nuclear
unit in which the generation costs remain hardly affected.
What is not shown in Figure 7.3 is the interactions that occur between all these factors
and changes in the merit order. E.g., if the price of natural gas drops to where it becomes
cheaper than nuclear, the CCGT plant can change merit-order and become base-load,
lowering the load factor for a nuclear and further affecting its profitability.
Figure 7.3: Sensitivities of Electricity Generation Costs (Gross et al.,  2007[16]).
In the presence of uncertainty and the irreversible nature of power generation
investment, LCOE calculations are inadequate and therefore need to be complemented or
replaced by improved methods. Some of the disadvantages concerning the suitability of
LCOE calculation are described next:
1. Omission of uncertainty
In the LCOE calculation only expected values are taken into consideration. Instead the
significant parameter of uncertainty is ignored. With the performance of sensitivity analysis
in which the LCOE values are calculated as a function of a chosen input parameter but with
all the other parameters remaining fixed, only restricted results can be achieved. Especially
concerning fuel and carbon prices which are suffering a high volatility in reality they should
be taken into account adequately by a power plant valuation method.
2. Omission of evaluation of the investment profitability
The LCOE is only capable in determining the cheapest technology based on the
assumption that an investment is needed. In deregulated markets unlike regulated markets,
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generation companies will chose to invest only if an investment is profitable. But the LCOE
method, which compares current electricity prices with the calculated LCOE values do not
take into account the uncertainty related to future electricity and carbon prices.
3. No consideration of time
One very important issue concerning power plant investments is the timing of the
investment. The NPV method (besides the LCOE method) is based on the assumption that
the investment is reversible, meaning that it may be withdrawn sometime in the future and
furthermore the costs can be recovered In reality, investments are more or less irreversible,
since the plant generally cannot be resold without losing considerable value. The option for
a power company in situations of uncertainty (e.g. a new allocation period in an emissions
trading scheme),is the possibility to delay an investment for some other future time. In these
situations, a greater project payoff may be obtained by waiting until the uncertainty has
been resolved than by investing immediately.
7.5 Screening Curve Method
The screening curve method is a graphical plot of the annual levelized costs for
different capacity factors with the levelised costs being plotted on the vertical axis and the
capacity factor along the horizontal axis (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: Screening curve ( Bhattacharyya, 2011[78]).
The combination of the screening curve analysis with the load-duration curve enables
the determination of the requested generation mix of a power system. (Figure 7.5
Bhattacharyya, 2011[78]).
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Figure 7.5: Screening curve and Load Duration ( Bhattacharyya, 2011[78]).
The screening curve is a useful tool in order to understand the role of different
technologies in the power utility sector because it focuses on the strategies concerning
system optimization. Despite the fact that it requires restricted amount of information, it is
capable in capturing the interdependence of capital and operating costs and the utilization
levels of the different generation technologies. However according to Bhattacharyya, 2011
[78]) ‘’it is not adequate for detailed production cost analysis or system expansion analysis
because it fails to capture the issues related to system reliability, resource constraints,
differences in characteristics of new technologies and the old technologies, etc.’’
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7.6 Power utilities strategic behavior and the real options
approach
7.6.1 Introduction
While in the short run power generators can only adjust their production mix, in the
medium and long run there is additionally the possibility to undertake new investments
towards less carbon intensive technologies. Such a long-term investment strategy can be
chosen based on different decision rules. We have discussed in chapter 7.3 the classical
approach which is based on the assumption that power decision makers will pick the
optimal strategy according to the Net Present Value (NPV) approach deciding to switch
from a given generation technology to another whenever the present value of the profits
generated by a less polluting technology exceeds the present value of the profits of the more
carbon intensive ones.
The disadvantages of this approach is that it does not take into account the crucial
factors of uncertainty, irreversibility and managerial flexibility, leading to inaccurate
judgements concerning the investment opportunity value of potential ,low carbon projects.
With investments in the power sector being irreversible and with long-term decisions which
need to be taken under all kinds of uncertainties (concerning for e.g. fuel costs, electricity
prices and emissions trading costs, etc.), new tools are required, which will be able to tackle
the problem better than the conventional DCF approach.
An example of such an approach is the real option-based approach (ROA) which will
be first introduced in the following section and then incorporated in the power utilities
investment decisions scheme.
7.6.2 The Real Options approach
Real option valuation is an adaptation of the theory of financial options, often
employed in the valuation of investment projects. It recognizes that the business
environment is dynamic and uncertain and that value can be created by corporate leadership
which identifies and exercises managerial flexibility over the entire life of the project.
Furthermore, a real option is a permit with different value at different time periods to
undertake some business decision, typically an option to make a capital investment. By
purchasing a permit e.g., a firm may have the real option of expanding, downsizing, or
abandoning other projects in the future. By investing in R&D, the firm may have real
options for further business development, mergers, acquisitions etc. Practically with such
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options, the firm will be able to flexibly manage its irreversible investment capitals, and at
the same time, taking into account the uncertainties and risks of future cash flow.
In the context of costly emissions, profit-seeking firms can invest in a new technology
(e.g. a “clean” power plant) early if they think the return on investment is high enough to
compensate them for the risks involved, or they can postpone the investment to acquire
more information on some of those risks.
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the ROA valuation is not considered as an
alternative valuation method to the DCF, but rather as an expanded DCF. In the expanded
DCF, the value of any investment consists of two components: the traditional (static ) NPV
of the direct cash flows, and the option value of the managerial flexibility. The difference
between the traditional DCF value and the real options value is shown in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: Real Option Valuation methodology – Comparison of ROV and classic discounted cash
flow methods source, Arthur D.Little, 2008[79].
The very characteristics of power plant investment decisions makes it particularly
relevant to use the ROA which has been actually applied to peak-load power plant
valuation, hydro power plant valuation (taking into account the flexibility in managing the
water level in its reservoir) and fuel switching in IGCC plants .
Despite the above described advantages of ROA , surveys indicate that real options
techniques are not widely used in a commercial setting within the electricity industry.(Gross
at al., 2007[16]).
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7.6.3 Real options incorporated in power utilities investment
decisions
Sapienza and Stefanoni, 2007[80] analyzed the impact of the ETS scheme on the power
sector and presented a roadmap describing how investment decision making is
accomplished by power utilities.
First of all they distinguished between two different situations: one describing the
problem of incumbents and a second for all new entrants. Incumbents are the holders of a
switch option who have the right, but not the obligation, to undertake an investment in order
to switch from the currently used technology to a less polluting technology. Switching
options are complex portfolios of call and put options and incumbents will eventually
switch among different production modes more than once during the actual operational life
of the power plant. Nevertheless, it has been recorded that in the power sector switching
from one technology to another involves such high investment costs that chances of an
operator switching more than once are most unlikely to occur. For this reason, the authors
of this paper consider just a single switch. This assumption allows the consideration of the
switch option as a simple call option giving its owner the possibility to exchange the
currently used technology, with another, the new introduced technology.
The new entrant is the owner of an option to wait, giving him the right, but not the
obligation, to invest in the market with one of the currently available technologies.
A typical approach to ROA power plant valuation involves directly modeling the spark
spread (Figure 7.7):
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Figure 7.7: Switching conditions for the incumbent (source: Sapienza and Stefanoni, 2007[80])
Regarding the short run switching conditions , the condition which makes the operator
indifferent concerning the 2 technologies is the EUA price which equates dark and spark
spread. In such a case changes in plant utilization are considered while no  additional
investments are undertaken.
Regarding the medium run switching conditions, the EUA’s threshold level have to be
calculated for two specific conditions.
The second condition (NPV=OPV) holds if there is no uncertainty regarding the
investment outcome ,which is the case if both fuel and EUA prices will remain constant
over the operational life of the two power plants. In this case the price of EUA which
causes the incumbent’s indifference concerning the choice between the two technologies is
the one that equates the operating NPV of the
existing coal plant to the NPV of the new constructed CCGT.
Finally, regarding the third switching condition, (NPV=OPV+SWITCH), the
uncertainty concerning the investment is taken into consideration by applying the Real
Option Approach. According to the ROA theory, in order to optimise the switch, the NPV
of the new built CCGT with a given EUA price, would have to be high enough to offset the
opportunity cost of abandoning the option.
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7.7 Power Generation Expansion Planning Models
7.7.1 Introduction
Prior to energy markets liberalization, large state-owned utilities developed capacity
expansion planning models which were able to determine the least-cost investment route,
given the plants in existence and different environmental and policy constraints .
The development towards electricity market competition and the constant growth of
different renewable power sources has pushed the research community to efforts to develop
decision and analysis support models adapted to the new energy market context.
Different classifications of decision support models concerning long-term electricity
planning exist. Ventosa et al.,2002 [81] present a review of the most recent publications
regarding electricity market modeling where they identify three major categories:
optimization models, equilibrium models and simulation models. These models differ
mainly in their mathematical background and market representation.
Optimization models focus on the profit maximization problem for one of the firms
competing in the market, while equilibrium models representing the overall market
behavior taking into consideration competition among all participants Finally Simulation
models are an alternative to equilibrium models when the problem under consideration is
too complex to be addressed within a formal equilibrium framework.
From a structural point of view, the different approaches that have been proposed in
the technical literature can be classified according to the scheme shown in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: Schematic representation of the electricity market modeling trends, Ventosa et al.,2002
[81].
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In the following, we give a brief description of simulation models, game-theoretic
models and optimization models. For these models, we consider some additional
classification criteria proposed by Botterud, 2003 [60]. These additional criteria are the
representation of supply, demand and the electricity market and the representation of
investment decisions.
Further references about the expansion planning approach include e.g. International
Atomic Energy Agency  [82], Foley et al., [83] who present among others a number of key
proprietary electricity systems software tools and finally a survey comparing different
approaches for power generation expansion planning from monopoly to competition given
by Kagiannas et al.,2004 [84].
7.7.2 Simulation Models
The main objective of descriptive electricity market models is to gain insights about
the way the electricity market works. Using this knowledge about the functionality of the
market, these models aim for predicting the future development of the market. Descriptive
models do not rely on the assumption of a perfect market, but can consider market
imperfections. This is an important feature, as electricity markets show different types of
imperfections ( e.g., Lemming, 2005 [10]). Descriptive models are based on a simulation.
Two different methodologies are applied to study the long-term development of electricity
markets: system dynamics and agent based simulation.
7.7.2.1 System Dynamics
System dynamics describes the development of a complex system with stocks and
flows. Its principle is based on the fact that interactions between elements of the power
system are analyzed through a set of non-linear differential equations while causal loops
and feed-back l loops are used to model the interdependencies between the components of
the system under study.
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Figure 7.9: 10 Loop diagram for investment in a typical energy market. + positive feed-back;−
negative feed-back; = delay. Assili et al, Energy Policy, 2008[85].
There are some applications of system dynamics to long term electricity market
modeling. Bunn and Larsen,1992 [86] use a system dynamics model to test how power
plant investments are influenced by various regulatory conditions, economic assumptions
and the strategic behavior of the separate companies.. Vogstad,2004 [87] uses a system
dynamics model to analyze long-term versus short-term implications of various energy
policies within the context of the Nordic electricity market. Concerning power generation
expansion, he also observes the boom and bust cycle. The same was pointed out by Olsina,
2005[88], who investigates the long-term development of the generation capacity.
7.7.2.2 Agent Based Simulation
While the system dynamics approach assumes a centralized decision maker, the agent
based simulation is focused on the study of collective behavior while considering multiple
independent agents. Agents are autonomous decision-maker with capabilities which may
behave differently concerning observation, communication, computation and action (e.g.,
based on their risk aversion) or they may face different restrictions. In addition, agents are
able to learn. Agent based modeling of electricity markets became popular during the last
years. For recent surveys and literature reviews see Sensfuß et al.,2007 [89].
With the desire for a long-term oriented simulation, Czernohous et al.,2003 [90] present
a basic agent-based model considering the investment decision within long-term planning
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of electricity markets. Additionally, regulatory agents are introduced as a third side in the
market simulation to represent governmental decisions. This results in the definition of
three types of agents representing electricity generating companies, consumers and
governmental instances.. The electricity prices are determined by auctions, where the
suppliers and customers place their bids. Two different planning layers are used. In the
short-term planning layer, the suppliers decide on the plant utilization and the bids for the
auction. The long-term planning layer is used to determine the investment decisions. The
investment decisions are formulated as an Linear Programming profit maximization
problem whereby the profit calculations are based on the electricity prices observed during
the last short-term period. The influence of governmental instances is included in the model
by regulatory agents affecting taxes on the emission of harmful substances and monitoring
prices.
Genoese et al.,2008 [91] study the impact of several emission allocation schemes the
power plant investments of the German energy system. The work is based on the
PowerACE model, which is an agent based simulation of the German electricity market. An
overview of the entire model and the main agents involved is given in Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10: PowerACE model overview source, Genoese et al.,2008 [91].
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The model includes a short-term spot market and a forward market for electricity, a
market for balancing power and a static emission allowances market. The prices obtained at
the spot market and the forward market are used to forecast electricity prices, which are
required for the investment planner. Based on these predicted prices, the investment planner
calculates the net present value for the different investment alternatives. Five different
emission allowance allocation schemes are tested with six gas and carbon price
combinations. In general an increase of electricity prices can be observed through the
introduction of an emissions trading (Figure 7.11).The highest price increase occurs in the
case of auctioning where also the highest emission reduction appears (up to 20% with low
gas prices). They further observed that the design of the allocation scheme has a significant
influence on power plant investments, electricity prices and carbon emissions.
Figure 7.11: Modeled Electricity price in the ‘gas-low’&’CO2-high’ scenario, Genoese et al.,2008
[91].
7.7.3 Game-Theoretic Models
The focus of game-theoretic models lies on the interaction of different market players.
Game-theoretic models are especially well suited for markets with not perfect competition
like oligopolies, where strategic behavior can be observed. However, they often use a
simplified description of the electricity market. Uncertainty, e.g. about future fuel prices is
not considered or if, only in a simplistic manner. Game-theoretic models are mainly used to
analyze market power and test different market designs. While the majority of the game-
theoretic models focuses on short-term questions, there are also some models considering
capacity expansions. Literature review in this direction includes Chuang et al.,2001 [92]
who study the effect of different levels of competition on capacity expansion, Ventosa et
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al.,2002 [81] who compared capacity expansion in electricity markets under imperfect
market conditions and under different assumptions about the timing of the investments and
Murphy and Smeers, 2005[93] who studied capacity expansion in an oligopolistic market
comparing the case of selling electricity in long-term contracts with the case when
electricity is sold on a spot market.
7.7.4 Optimization Models
Apart from the pre-mentioned fact that optimization models focus on the one –firm
profit maximization problem, most of them rely at least partly on the assumption of a
perfect competition. The majority of recent optimization models in the field of power
generation expansion is based on the real options approach. While these models are not able
to represent strategic behavior as it can be done with a game-theoretic approach, they
generally model the electricity market and the uncertainties related to power generation
expansion in more detail.
Amongst the optimization models, there are important differences in the way the
investment decisions and the electricity market are represented. Concerning the
representation of investment decisions, Botterud, 2003[60] distinguishes three perspectives:
centralized decision making, decentralized decision making considering multiple decision
makers and decentralized decision making considering a single decision maker. The
representation of the electricity market can either be based on simulation, or on a
fundamental electricity market model.
In the following, we first discuss the differences between centralized and decentralized
decision making, before we present different power generation valuation approaches based
on electricity price simulation. Then, we give a detailed overview of power generation
expansion models based on fundamental electricity market models.
7.7.4.1 Representation of Investment Decisions
Centralized decision making can be observed in regulated electricity markets. As these
markets are monopolies, there is one single decision maker who controls the whole system.
From the modeling approaches presented, the system dynamics approach as well as some
optimization models use a centralized decision maker. However, in deregulated electricity
markets, there are several competing actors on the market. In such an environment, a
decentralized approach considering different market players is more realistic.
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Decentralized decision making can be further distinguished. The first possibility is to
model several individual decision makers interacting through the power market. The
decision makers may have individual objectives or may be restricted by individual
constraints. Such an approach is taken by agent based models and also by game-theoretic
models. The other possibility is to optimize the investment of a single decision maker, and
represent all other decision makers as an aggregated decision maker. The decisions of this
aggregated decision maker may be fixed externally or depend on the feedback from the
power market. Such an approach is taken by some optimization models. It is often stated
that in a competitive market, the social welfare maximization problem leads to the same
result as the profit maximization for single generation companies (e.g.,Weber and
Swider,2004 [94]). Hence, the decentralized investment problem may be replaced with a
centralized approach.
However, as discussed by Botterud, 2003[60], there are several special characteristics
of a power market that can distort the social welfare equilibrium. These factors are the
limited price elasticity of demand, a price cap introduced by regulators, the potential
exercise of market power and the lumpiness of investments. Botterud, 2003[60] compared
the outcomes of centralized and decentralized investment models, and concludes that under
the centralized model, investments are higher.
From the modeling point of view, it makes a great difference whether a centralized or a
decentralized decision maker is chosen. If the contribution margins for new units are
determined by a fundamental market model based on an LP formulation, then using a
centralized decision maker makes it possible to integrate the investment decisions into the
existing model. This is possible because the problem can be formulated as a cost
minimization problem subject to demand satisfaction.
Taking the perspective of a single, decentralized decision maker, the demand
satisfaction constraint no longer exists in a deregulated market. The objective of the
considered decision maker is profit maximization. The profit depends on the amount of
produced electricity, the costs for producing the electricity and the electricity prices. While
the amount of produced electricity is a variable in the unit commitment problem and the
costs can also be expressed as a variable in the unit commitment problem, the electricity
prices are indirectly determined as dual variables of the electricity demand constraint. This
indirect determination of electricity prices makes it impossible to incorporate the
investment decisions into a decentralized unit commitment model.
As a consequence, unit commitment decisions and investment decisions must be taken
by two separate models. The investment problem can be formulated as an SDP problem as
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briefly outlined in section 1.5.2.2. However, as a consequence, the unit commitment must
be optimized for all states of the SDP problem. Depending on the number of considered
investment alternatives and the number of stochastic scenarios, this number can be huge.
7.7.4.2 Pure Simulation-Based Models
The electricity price models presented in section can be used for power plant valuation.
To determine the profits of new units, assumptions must be made about the amount of
produced electricity. A common assumption is that a unit produces when the simulated
electricity prices are higher than the marginal costs of the unit.
Deng,2005 [71] researched the option to invest in a natural gas plant based on
stochastic natural gas and electricity spot prices through the extension of a model, which
was initially based on a spark spread option valuation scheme, in order to take into
consideration the price spikes and jumps of the electricity spot prices. He claims that such
price jumps and spikes can have a significant impact on investment decisions.
Fleten and Näsäkkälä, 2003[94] used forward prices in order to evaluate the option to
invest in a CCGT unit. Optimal investment entry and exit threshold values are determined
depending on the level of operational flexibility of the plant. The results of this work
indicate that the operational flexibility has a significant impact on the investment
thresholds.
7.7.4.3 Models Based on Fundamental Electricity Market Models
In recent years quite a few models where developed as fundamental electricity
markets models. The biggest part of these models are based on a combination of the real
options approach with a fundamental electricity market model while taking into
consideration uncertainties of  e.g. fuel prices or carbon prices ,which are limited to a few
scenarios only, though .
Further analysis of these models is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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7.8 Literature Review on the impact of EU ETS on Investment
Decisions
The EU ETS and its influence on corporate decisions so far have been analyzed from
different viewpoints. Most of this research does not empirically investigate the actual
effects of the EU ETS since its introduction. Instead, the focus is rather on expected effects
such as the possible outcomes of different regulatory specifications. This is mainly because
the system has only been started recently and corporate reactions are still in the process of
being implemented.
In fact literature on power generation investment under uncertainty is growing rapidly.
The idea here is not to provide an exhaustive survey, but rather to give a taste of the
diversity of studies that have been added to the literature in recent years.
In an empirical report from year 2005 prepared by IPA Energy with the title ‘’
Implications of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for the UK Power Generation
Sector’’[95], several UK and European power industries cited as the most important factors
which affect investment decisions in the power generation industry are the financial
fundamentals (e.g., spark spread for CCGT plants and the feed-in tariffs for renewable
technology) and the degree of market liberalization. Taxation was a further factor reported ,
whereas transportation costs of fuel and electricity were mentioned as a less important
constraint, which was still important for new built plants. Finally, the EU ETS decisions
were seen as important, but relatively less than the aforementioned.
A more recent empirical survey dated December 2009 carried out by New Energy
Finance ‘’Impacts of the EU ETS on power sector investments –a survey of European
utilities’’, 2009 [96 ] concerning the largest EU power companies, showed that the EU ETS
was inhibiting capital investment decisions in the European power industry. The key
conclusions from the survey were:
 ‘’Carbon prices are being fully integrated into investment decisions in the
European power sector. All power generators interviewed in the survey calculate a
carbon price in their investment decisions with most running several future price
scenarios
 Although the carbon price (current and projected) is not sufficient to justify an
immediate wholesale shift to lower CO2 emitting technologies it is making power
companies alter their investment focus to include more lower carbon technologies,
such as CCGT and high efficiency coal, in their future plant mix.
 The EU ETS is having a clear impact on:
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 The addition of new biomass co-firing capacity
 Early closure of older, dirtier oil, coal and lignite plants, particularly in the
Large Combustion Plant Directive
 Investments in CCS although direct government support also plays a role in
CCS decisions, the EU ETS is the most important consideration
 In most cases the EU ETS is one factor taken into account when making investment
decisions in the power sector. Fuel prices, electricity prices and direct government
subsidies or targets (for renewables ) are equally important.’’
Hoffman, 2007[8] has done an empirical research on the effect of the CO2 price on
investment decisions in the period 2005-2007 by performing interviews with people from
five power companies in Germany.
Regarding the effectiveness of the EU ETS, the findings from the case studies for the
German electricity industry suggest that the basic principle of the regulation is functioning
as CO2 allowance prices are integrated into  corporate decision making. Furthermore
Hoffman argues that although the EU ETS presents an important first move towards the
mitigation of climate change, the actual technological changes induced by the EU ETS
seem to be only moderate. The industry takes limited  risk and implements low carbon
investments such as short-term investments  such as retrofits or investments with an option
character such as R&D. However, for large-scale investment decisions which have long
amortization time periods, the implementation of the EU ETS during its first phase did not
obtain an optimal regulatory environment for low carbon electricity generation.
A set of further studies dealt with the analysis of one of the aims of the EU ETS which
is to encourage innovation. Schleich and Betz, 2005[97] contributed an evaluation of the
regulatory details of the EU ETS from the point of view of technological innovation
incentive . They concluded that there are only mediocre incentives for developing low
carbon technologies under the imposed allocation rules for the trial phase between 2005 and
2007 because most of the scheme’s design characteristics are not optimally implemented.
Oberndorfer and Rennings, 2007[98] compare different theoretical studies to estimate the
effects of the EU ETS on competitiveness and came to similar to Schleich and Betz
conclusions that the scheme’s impact on innovation is rather restricted.
Grubb and Newbery, 2007[99] argue that the CO2 price risk has the important feature
of being mainly a regulatory risk which is definitely hard for private companies to manage .
Furthermore, they argue that this risk for fossil fuel plants is limited because they can pass
through the risk of CO2 and fuel price to end consumers due to the fact that fossil fuel
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plants are usually the marginal plants. They conclude that investors will take the lowest
possible risk while investing in a CCGT that is characterized by short lead times and low
investment costs.
Research by Jensen & Meibom, 2008[100] focused on the effect of the CO2 price on
investments in gas fired power plants concentrating in the Nordic spot market. They
analyzed the possibility and the time frame investors choose to invest in new production
capacity depending on their existing portfolio of power producing units. With the
assumption of perfect competition an electricity market equilibrium model of the Nordic
power system was developed in combination with a real options model concerning
investment decisions. Various scenarios were modeled for the development of key
parameters such as the CO2 emission allowance price in order to find out the impacts for
investments in a natural gas fired power plant they concluded that new investments are
extremely sensitive to the investors existing power production portfolio due to the
competition of new production units  with the existing power plants.
Roques et al., 2008[101] carried out a portfolio analysis taking into consideration
nuclear, gas and coal plant investment options. They concluded that for risk averse
companies the most attractive, possible choice is to have a portfolio consisting only of
natural gas plants or a portfolio with a high percentage of gas plants. It is important to
mention that the authors conclusion is based on the assumption that in  liberalized markets
the prices of natural gas, CO2 and electricity are highly correlated with each other.
Furthermore if prices showed limited correlationd, the best investment strategy would be
more diversification between all three technologies.
Kara et al.,2008[102] investigated policy uncertainty who argue that investors in the
Nordic electricity market postpone their investments due to the regulatory uncertainty
regarding the EU ETS.
Regarding short term investment planning, the real options approach was preferred and
implemented by e.g. Tseng et al., 2002[103] who presented a valuation method for power
plants using a Monte Carlo simulation which can additionally be used for long-term
valuation purposes and Hlouskova et al., 2005[104] who used complex Monte-Carlo
simulations which proved to be especially advantageous in dealing with jumps as the
underlying risk factor, showing the best application in peaking units which are
characterized by rare and short lived spikes.
At the same time, quite a number of long-term planning methods have been developed.
Recent examples include Fleten et al., 2007[105], who argue that power plant investments
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demand higher returns than the typical net-present-value (NPV) breakeven point while
using a real options approach with stochastic prices .
Using ROA, Sekar, 2005[106] evaluated investments in three coal fired generation
technologies considering uncertain CO2 prices: pulverized coal, standard Integrated
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC), and IGCC with pre investments to reduce the cost of
future carbon capture and storage (CCS). His contribution concentrates on the development
of the cash flow model for each of the three technologies, with the CO2 price being an
uncertain variable combining market-based valuation to calculate cash flow uncertainty and
dynamic quantitative modeling to capture the effect of uncertainty.
Laurikka, 2006[107] presented a simulation model using the real option approach in
order to assess the value of the Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology
operating inside an emissions trading scheme. The model took into consideration three
types of stochastic variables which were the price of electricity, fuel an emission
allowances. His major conclusion was that the IGCC technology is not competitive within
the EU ETS without taking into account of the CO2 prices.
Further use of real options has taken place in the area of modeling uncertain climate
change policy, e.g., Rothwell, 2006[108] used the ROA approach to evaluate risks deriving
from the development of new nuclear power plants. His model considered the uncertainties
of price, output and cost risk. He concluded that the return on the investment for a nuclear
plant needs to be higher in an investment environment with prevailing uncertain carbon
prices compared with one in which carbon  prices are characterized by certainty.
Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006[109], Kiriyama and Suzuki, 2004[110] deal with the
impacts of uncertain future emissions trading and with CO2 penalties within a real options
setup. It needs to be mentioned that in these models, the design of emissions trading
schemes and the number of allowances that are freely allocated are main characteristics of
the overall models.
Blyth et al., 2007[49]) and Yang et al., 2007[68] argue that the climate change policy
uncertainty is reflected in the investment decisions through an uncertain carbon price. They
have compared a gas, coal and nuclear power plant and they  further claimed that decisions
under uncertainty should only be taken ‘’when the costs of waiting exceed the expected
value of information available through waiting’’. Furthermore they argued that ‘’the value
of waiting is more important when a regulatory intervention is closer in time because there
is less time left before the intervention’’. Figure 7.12 shows the risk premiums (i.e. the
additional financial returns that would be required to carry out the investment) in terms of
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additional capital investment costs (USD/kW) that are associated with uncertainties of
energy and carbon price.
Figure 7.12: Range of risk premiums for new investments created by uncertainty, Blyth et al.,
2007[28]).
Blyth, W., 2007 [1] states that the periodic behavior of regulatory interventions , such
as are observed in the case of the EU-ETS where new emissions caps are set before the
launch of each regular trading period,  lead to the periodic behavior of the risk premiums as
well (Figure 7.13.) With the date of the policy review getting closer, the risk premium soars
because there is not enough time available to achieve a return on investment before a
change in the policy conditions. As soon as the new policy environment has been
established, the risk premium drops again until the next rise which will take place when the
next policy review point will approach. In conclusion, power utilities will have the tendency
to show preference in making their investments as far as possible from the next expected
policy review, a fact which leads to cyclical investment phases.
Figure 7.13: Periodic regulatory intervention leads to periodic investment phases., Blyth, 2007[1].
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Both reports also state that nuclear plants seem to be more exposed to CO2 price risk
than fossil fuel plants. The CO2 price also influences the marginal cost of a gas or a coal
plant, but does not influence the marginal cost of a nuclear plant, thus the impact of a CO2
price change is for a nuclear plant definitely larger.
Yang and Blyth, 2007[69] undertook the real option approach with the computer
modeling to quantify the impacts of the climate change policy which is looming up as an
essential factor in the power sector investment. Different from the previous studies, they
formulated multi stage investments taking two stochastic variables into account: prices of
electricity and CO2 allowance.
7.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented methods for assessing investment projects under
uncertainty. First, we described briefly which are the actual strategic actions taken by
power generators. In the following section, we presented different methods used in decision
making on power plant investments: the DCF analysis, the LCOE approach, the screening
curve method and the real options approach. The first, the second (which is based on the
first ) and the third methods are mainly used in regulated market conditions, and are not
suited to consider the uncertainties to which generation companies are exposed in a
deregulated market.
The real options approach was developed for investments under uncertainty. Besides
the question whether to invest or not, the real options approach also addresses the question
when to invest based on the assumption that the option to invest has a value. Due to its
ability to consider uncertainties in an appropriate way, most investment models used widely
today are based on the real options approach.
In the last section of this chapter we briefly described some simulation-based and some
game-theoretic approaches to power generation expansion, before we discussed the
optimization based power generation expansion models.
Next we presented a literature review on the impact of the EU ETS on power plant
investment decisions.
The first conclusion drawn from the literature review on the impact of EU ETS on
investment decisions is, according to an empirical survey by New Energy Finance, 2008 ,
the fact that the EU ETS is indeed starting to change the European power industry’s capital
investment decisions.
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The same conclusion is delivered by a further empirical study by Hoffman, 2007 who
argues that CO2 allowance prices are integrated into several aspects of corporate decision
making although actual technological changes induced by the EU ETS seem to be moderate
and mostly concentrated on low carbon investments with limited risks such as short-term
investments or investments with an inherent option character (R&D), whereas for large-
scale, low carbon investments, regulatory and price uncertainties reduced the incentives.
Concerning the impact of EU ETS on technological innovation incentives for the EU ETS
pilot phase 2005-07, two studies -Schleich and Betz, 2005 and Oberndorfer and Rennings,
2007- both conclude that the scheme’s impact on innovation investments has been rather
small.
Furthermore it is evident from the literature review that there is no agreement among
contributors on what is the best investment strategy concerning CO2 price uncertainty.
Some argue that a pure portfolio of gas plants is the best because when the CO2 price
increases the electricity price increases as well adding to the fact that gas plants have a short
lead time and low investment cost (Grubb and Newbery, 2007, Roques et al., 2008).
According to Hoffman, different companies come to different conclusions about what
is the best investment strategy based on the assumptions they use in their investment
analysis.
A lot of authors agree that the option to wait with the investment decisions can have a
certain value (Yang et al., 2007, Jensen and Meibom, 2008, Blyth at al, 2007[67]). Others
have already observed the behavior that power companies seem to delay their investment
decisions (Kara et al., 2008, Hoffman, 2007).
The characteristics of power plant investment decisions makes it particularly relevant to
use the ROA. The ROA has been applied e.g. to valuations of a peak-load power plant (
Hlouskova et al., 2005), gas fired power plants (Jensen & Meibom, 2008) pulverized coal
and Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants, Sekar, 2005; Laurikka,
2006),of regulatory risks in the development of new nuclear power plants Rothwell, 2006
etc.
Concerning short-term investment planning, real options were used by Tseng e.al, 2002
who presented a method for valuing a power plant which can also be used to aid long-term
valuation, Hlouskova et al.,2005 who developed a method which prove to be especially
advantageous when price jumps and spikes occur applying best in peaking units while
Fleten et al., 2007, contributed in a long-term planning approach.
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The impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment decisions has been modeled with
ROA by many studies (Blyth et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007 ; Kara et al.,2008 Brunekreeft
and Mc Daniel, 2005; Rothwell, 2006; Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006; Kiriyama and Suzuki,
2004).
In summary, as the regulation has only been implemented recently, the literature seems
to be missing empirical evidence regarding the actual effects that the EU ETS has on power
generation firms although the price signal affects their investment decisions.
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CHAPTER8
8 CONCLUSIONS
Power plant investments are uncommon for financial and technical reasons, with
large capital outflows which demand reliable valuation and decision-making tools. In
addition, power plant investments are characterized by a certain form of irreversibility and
the option to postpone which expose investors to several long run uncertainties with the
most important being long-term electricity and fuel prices.
The process of investment decision-making for European power utilities became
more complex with the implementation of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) in 2005, because it introduced a highly uncertain and volatile price on carbon
emissions, as a possible way to create incentives for companies to adjust their behavior and
invest in lower-emitting technologies. Furthermore, the electricity market liberalization has
progressed, introducing uncertain customer demand as well as uncertain power prices which
have made the investment decision-making procedure even more difficult.
We have documented in chapter 5 of this work that the EU ETS affects the
operations and the profitability of power generators. The impact of the EU ETS is felt
indeed in many different parts of the business although the existence of a carbon price does
not guarantee that abatement will take place. Actually there are other factors in the market
which will change the ultimate impact of emissions trading. E.g., the merit order and the
aspects influencing its structure provide a better tool for looking at the dynamics of power
plant portfolios.
Taking into consideration the risks to which power plant profitability is  exposed
which are fuel, carbon, and electricity price risks as well as risks  about the legal
framework, we have presented in chapter 6 different approaches to forecast through
modeling fuel, carbon and electricity prices. We concluded that there is a wide variety of
different stochastic processes used for the simulation of these highly interdependent prices,
but there is actually no consensus in literature which approach is the appropriate one.
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The critical discussion in chapter 7 of the classical valuation methods used in
decision making on power plant investments such as the DCF analysis, the LCOE approach
and the screening curve method showed that these are insufficient considering uncertainties.
In an effort to overcome these limitations, the real options approach evolved recently
allowing decision makers to incorporate uncertainty in their investment decisions by giving
them the option to postpone the initial investment undertaken, which gives them flexibility
in the investment timing, the option to alter operation scale (expand or contract),the  option
to abandon (temporarily or definitively) and the option to switch (from one operating
process to another) . Studies have shown that the ROA has been successfully applied e.g. to
valuations of a peak-load power plant , gas fired power plants , pulverized coal and
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants.
Furthermore, the shift towards more liberalized markets triggered interest in
developing electricity market models which are very capable software tools modeling
various portfolios and multiple scenarios with the interest concentrating on optimization
models, equilibrium models and simulation models.
Because the regulation has only been implemented recently, there is not enough
empirical evidence regarding the actual effects that EU ETS and consequently the carbon
price have on power generation firms although the price signal affecting their investment
decisions has been confirmed.
Empirical studies have shown that carbon prices influence the European power
industry’s capital investment decisions with technological changes induced by the EU ETS,
while at the same time being rather week and mostly concentrated on low carbon
investments of limited risks such as short-term investments or investments in R&D,
whereas for large-scale, low carbon investments, regulatory and price uncertainties reduce
the incentives. Moreover, studies have shown that for the EU ETS pilot phase 2005-07, the
scheme’s impact on innovation investments has been rather small.
Unfortunately there is no agreement in bibliography on what is the best investment
strategy concerning CO2 price uncertainty. E.g. some contributors argue that a pure
portfolio of gas plants is the best possible, while others suggest that the CO2 price
uncertainty will be an incentive to further diversification.
Furthermore, a lot of authors agree to a general rule that investment decisions under
uncertainty should only be taken when the costs of waiting exceed the expected value of
information available through waiting, while others have already observed the behavior that
power companies seem to delay their investment decisions due to the carbon price.
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The fact that the climate change policy uncertainty is represented in the investment
decision by means of an uncertain carbon price, might lead to thoughts of implementing,
alternatively to the cap-and-trade scheme, of other carbon policies. E.g. through imposing a
sufficiently high carbon tax, carbon market price volatility would extinguish and
investments in low emission technologies could be stimulated.  In report [21], the clear
advantages of a carbon tax were modeled and documented while stating that a carbon tax
results in lower electricity prices and , in contrary to emissions trading, to a complete phase
out of conventional coal power plants.
Reconsideration of current carbon policies by policy makers and a switch to an
alternative (for e.g. like in United Kingdom with the recent introduction of a hybrid carbon
policy), might be the secret in achieving long-term visibility and the diminish of market
volatility of the European carbon price which in turn would assist European utilities
decision makers in optimizing their power plant investments in the best possible way.
Finally, policy makers should bear in mind that the abandonment of the EU ETS
must be considered as a realistic future option in the very probable case that no post–Kyoto
international agreement will be agreed, otherwise big troubles are ahead for the European
power generation industry.
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